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ABSTRACT 
The rapid expansion of the offshore oil and gas activities into deeper waters and harsher 
environments has burden the industry with taking higher risks for developing fields.  The 
lessons learned from past major accidents have shaped the today’s health, safety and 
operational requirements of the industry.  Major efforts have been invested in 
development of analytical approaches to address occupational accidents of catastrophic 
proportions (high-severity, low-frequency).  However, there is a lack of similar tools for 
accidents characterized as low-severity, high-frequency, which impose similar risks. 
 
To address this gap, the Attwood's reliability model (Attwood 2006) which was originally 
developed for the quantification of occupational accidents in the oil and gas industry has 
been revised and enhanced from a deterministic framework to a probabilistic approach.  
In addition, Attwood's model was extended to be used as an occupational risk estimation 
tool.  The following important modifications were made: development of a probabilistic 
approach and use of Monte Carlo simulation, development of appropriate model 
calibration procedures, implementation of mathematical, computational codes and 
statistical tools, modification of expert survey analysis and finally, risk estimation.  The 
final product is a useful tool for:  prediction of occupational accidents likelihood on a 
specific offshore platform, estimation of accident rate, allocator of resources to specific 
key entities of the model to produce optimal safety results as well as occupational risk 
estimator.  At the end, recommendations are provided to further advance the state-of-the-
art.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General 
To meet the world’s energy demand, oil and gas offshore operations have been constantly 
moving into deeper waters and harsher environments.  Given the particular characteristics 
of the offshore oil and gas industry and the harsh environmental working conditions, 
significant accidents have occurred in the past.  Those events have shaped today's 
occupational health and safety requirements and operational guidelines for the industry.   
 
The industry, regulatory organizations and the research community have exerted 
significant amounts of efforts and resources into studying major accidents which are often 
considered of low-frequency, but high-severity type of incident.  As such, sophisticated 
analytical models have been developed to address occupational accidents of catastrophic 
proportions (high severity and low frequency).  However, there is a lack of similar tools 
for accidents characterized as low severity and high frequency, which impose similar 
danger overall (Attwood 2006, Khanzode, Maiti et al., 2012).  Attwood (2006) developed 
a numerical approach to predict those accidents characterized as low severity and high 
frequency using a deterministic approach.  Occupational accidents involve all accidents or 
injuries that happen in a work environment.  This research however deals only with those 
occupational accidents categorized as low severity–high frequency in the offshore 
working environments which represent a large percentage of all reported accidents.   
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1.2 Overall Objectives of This Research 
The overall objective of this research is to enhance the quantitative model for 
occupational accidents probability prediction presented by Attwood (2006) by changing it 
from a deterministic approach where the model parameters consist of single average input 
values to a probabilistic framework whereby probability functions describe model 
parameters.  In a probabilistic approach, techniques such as the Monte Carlo Simulation 
can be used to obtain a wide range of possible outcomes and their likelihoods.  
Furthermore, to set bases for a risk estimation tool using accident likelihood model output 
for: 
 prediction of occupational accidents likelihood on a specific offshore platform, 
 estimation of accident rate,  
 allocation of resources to specific key entities of the model to produce optimal 
safety results, and 
 estimation of occupational risk.  
 
1.3 Overview of the Present Research  
The reliability base model for the estimation of occupational accidents in the offshore oil 
and gas industry, proposed by Attwood (2006), intents to cover the gap of occupational 
accident research in the oil and gas industry.  The idea of this model originated with the 
recognition of several similarities between the components of the accident process and a 
reliability network (interconnections of a mechanical/electrical engineering system).  One 
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of the novelties of this model is its holistic approach; which considers the influence of 
societal factors, organizational factors, and factors directly related with the overall system 
in the occupational accident causation.  Another advantage of this model is the 
introduction of expert opinion, which helps to update constantly the ever-changing 
environment of offshore installations.  The model was specifically designed for offshore 
operations and it is relatively simple to understand and to apply. 
 
In this research important modifications and further extension of the model have been 
done to improve the original idea.  Changes are briefly listed as follow: 
 Development of a Probabilistic approach: The model variables have been 
introduced as probabilistic values (functions describing variable characteristics) 
with the objective of representing more realistically the uncertainty associated 
with each one of them in order to reproduce more reliable probabilistic outcomes. 
 Modifications in model calibration: Important modifications and correction to 
previous approach have been implemented for the model calibration.  The model 
has been calibrated using global data as an equation with seven unknowns.  Large 
amount of data and data analysis from the oil and gas producers (OGP) reports 
(from 2000 to 2012) were required for this task.  Regional OGP data (from seven 
regions worldwide) were used to solve the proposed new equation using 
MATLAB. 
 Development of Monte Carlo simulations to get probabilistic outcomes of the 
model:  This approach was an entirely new contribution to the model.  Monte 
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Carlo simulations are widely used in risk analysis, given that there is significant 
uncertainty in variable inputs as it is the case in the Reliability Model.  
 Modification in expert survey analysis: Important modifications have been 
implemented to this portion of the research in order to fit the changes applied to 
the model. 
 Testing and validations. 
 Risk estimation: This is an entire new step implemented to the model for the 
occupational risk assessment of offshore operations. 
 
This revised model can: 
 Predict the likelihood of occupational accidents on a specific offshore platform,  
 Estimate accident rate within an industry sector, 
 Provide the means to effectively direct resources deployment to produce optimal 
safety results. 
 Provide the means to assess the reliability of model predictions (uncertainty 
analysis). 
 Estimate of risk of occupational accidents in the offshore oil and gas industry. 
 
The revised model is an important step forward towards occupational risk assessment 
evaluation in offshore platforms.  The revised model may be used for the calculation of 
accident frequency (the accident frequency is the probability of an occupational accident 
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happening in an offshore platform in a given year) and design of safety measures to 
minimize risk.   
1.4 Thesis Structure 
A brief description of the background information that motivated this research is given in 
Section 2 followed by a thorough literature review specific to this research in Section 3.  
The research methodology including the theory behind the base case Attwood (2006) 
model and its associated model parameters is presented in Section 4.  The results of the 
analyses and simulations including the calibration procedures and risk estimations have 
been discussed in Section 5, followed conclusions and recommendations for future 
research to advance the state-of-the-art.  
 
The supporting documents and materials have been appended to this thesis.  Appendix I 
summarize the safety performance indicators processed from the Oil and Gas Producers 
database of total recordable injury rate (TRIR).  The database includes data from 2000 to 
2011.  The survey responses obtained from expert opinions for Influence Coefficients and 
Strength Values were normalized before use in this work.  The results are included in 
Appendix II.  
 
Appendix III comprises the MATLAB code written to solve the seven unknown elements 
of the Reliability Model.  Appendix IV presents the MATLAB code to obtain the two-
parameter Weibull distributions for each of the seven reliability elements. 
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2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The offshore oil and gas industry has changed dramatically in the last decades, showing 
an exponential growth when compared to its beginning.  The changes are mainly 
occurring due to the decrease of available shallow water resources, increase in demand 
and the rapid advancement in technology.  Currently, Perdido is the world’s deepest 
offshore oil drilling and production platform, moored in 2,450 metres of water in the Gulf 
of Mexico.  This infrastructure has opened up a new frontier in deep-water oil and gas 
production (Shell Global 2010).   
 
Given the particular characteristics of the offshore oil and gas industry and the harsh 
environmental working conditions, significant accidents have occurred in the past.  Those 
events have shaped today's occupational health and safety requirements and operational 
guidelines for the industry.  Examples are: the Grand Banks of Newfoundland (1982), 
with the loss of 84 lives; the fire and explosions on the Piper Alpha production platform 
in the North Sea (1988), with a loss of 167 lives; or the most recent "Deepwater Horizon" 
accident in the USA Gulf of Mexico (2010) that claimed the lives of 11 people and was 
declare as the worst oil spill in the USA history.  As a result, newer and stricter standards 
and regulations are set in place worldwide.  Therefore, there is a major interest from the 
government agencies, private sector, and scientific communities to continue improving 
the safety conditions of offshore installations.  As an example, on June 10th 2013 the 
European Union (EU) adopted a directive on safety of offshore oil and gas operations.  
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This directive covers the entire cycle of exploration and production activities and has the 
objective of ensure that the highest safety standards will be followed at every oil and gas 
platform across Europe (EU 2013).   
 
Considering that occupational safety can be defined as the control of recognized 
occupational hazards in order to achieve an acceptable level of risk.  Then, the estimation 
of risk levels and the assessment of their significance has currently become an important 
tool for comparison with acceptance criteria and reduction of risk levels in the work 
environment.   
 
As stated by Khanzode, Maiti et al. (2012) in their comprehensive review of accident 
research, major efforts have been invested in occupational accidents of catastrophic 
proportions such as explosions, burns, and air or water transport accidents.  These 
accidents are characterized for its high severity–low frequency and have a high impact in 
the public opinion.  However, Khanzode, Maiti et al. (2012) noted in their review that risk 
assessment techniques do not quantify risk of occupational injury to an individual, per se. 
 
Attwood (2006) also stated, “occupational accidents that in comparison can be considered 
of minor severity such as slips, trips and falls can impose similar danger overall, than the 
low frequency-high severity ones”.  He based his conclusion from the International 
Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) data for the years 1998 to 2002 and 
documents from the UK HSE, 1996 both of which indicated that over a third of all 
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reported major injuries result from slips or trips, are considered the single most common 
cause of injuries.  Attwood (2006) recognized that there was a lack of quantitative models 
for the estimation of this particular type of occupational accidents in the oil and gas 
industry and developed a Reliability Model for the Quantification of Occupational 
Accidents to cover this gap.   
 
Figure Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2 show the summary of OGP data corresponding to two 
safety indicators. Fatality and lost work day cases for the years of 2009 to 2011. Error! 
Reference source not found. illustrates fatalities reported by OGP on offshore and 
onshore activities.  The fatality safety indicator shows that “occupational accidents” 
(struck by, falls from height and caught in or under) represent approximately 45% of the 
data.    
Figure 2-2 represents data exclusively for offshore activities and shows that “occupational 
accidents” represent approximately 75% of the data.  
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Figure 2-1 Summary of Fatalities by Cause for the Years 2009 to 2012 (International 
Association of the Oil and Gas Producers, 2009, 2010 & 2011) 
 
 
Figure 2-2  Summary of Fatalities by Cause for the Years 2009 to 2012 (International 
Association of the Oil and Gas Producers, 2009, 2010 & 2011) 
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Both figures above confirm Attwood's (2006) conclusion that it is evident that accidents 
categorized as more frequent and less severe (e.g. struck by, falls from height, caught in 
between and under, etc.) represent a considerable percentage of the overall reported 
occupational accidents.  
 
Occupational accidents involve all accidents or injuries that happen in a work place that 
results in injuries to workers.  However, the term occupational accidents in this research 
is used (unless otherwise specified) to estimate the accidents categorized as low severity–
high frequency in the offshore working environments; which as stated above, represent a 
large percentage of all reported accidents (such as struck by, slips and trips, falls, caught 
in under or between, etc.).   
 
Over the recent years, numerous models and theories have been developed aiming to 
improve the organization’s safety performance.  However, there is still more work to do 
for the specific conditions of offshore operations.  It is been recognized that to reduce the 
likelihood of occurrence of accidents, it is essential that scenarios involving the potential 
loss of operational control need to be assessed at early stages.  However, it is important to 
recognize that offshore activities are often associated with high levels of uncertainty for 
the following reasons: they usually operate in a constantly changing environment; 
offshore installation are complex and expensive engineering structures composed of many 
systems and each one of them are usually unique with its own design and operational 
characteristics (Wang, Sii et al. 2004).  On the other hand, it is important to acknowledge 
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that human and organizational elements significantly influence the safety of offshore 
installations (Ren, et. al., 2009).  Therefore, the need of integrated models with flexible 
approaches to facilitate its application continues to exist. 
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW  
3.1 Overview of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry 
The offshore oil and gas industry started about six decades ago, when in October 1947 a 
mobile rig drilled in approximately 4.3 meters (14 feet) of water in the open Gulf of 
Mexico's Ship Shoal Area.  The world offshore oil and gas industry has changed 
dramatically since then.  Nowadays, the technical capabilities, the number of people 
working in this industry, and the rate of oil production in this particular sector all show an 
exponential growth when compared to its beginning. 
 
Historically, the highest levels of activities are conducted in regions of the North Sea, 
Gulf of Mexico, the South China Sea, and the Caspian Sea.  However, more recently, 
offshore operations have expanded to West Africa, India, and the deep waters off the 
coast of Brazil and Eastern Canada.  It is estimated that approximately 60% of the world's 
petroleum production comes from offshore operations in waters of more than half the 
coastal nations on earth, including Canada (Ministry of Energy 2012).   
 
The challenging working conditions of offshore oil and gas platforms are well-known.  
Significant accidents have occurred in the past in this particular industry.  These accidents 
have attracted public concerns at all levels.  Accidents such as the one of 1982 on the 
Grand Banks off Newfoundland, with the loss of 84 lives; the 1988 fire and explosions on 
the Piper Alpha production platform in the North Sea, with a loss of 167 lives; or the 
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recent 2010 BP oil spill disaster that claimed the lives of 11 people and was declared as 
the worst oil spill in the USA history.  All of them have result in stricter regulations for 
the offshore oil and gas industry with respect to the environment and occupational health 
and safety issues. 
 
Subsequently, the need to improve safety planning and performance for the offshore oil 
and gas industry has become a very important subject in the last decade.  The offshore Oil 
and Gas (O&G) sector, researchers, government agencies, and various organizations are 
directing resources to improve their ability to respond to those new growing demands in 
safe and sustainable manner. 
 
3.2 Particular Features of Working in Offshore Environments 
Several features of offshore work have direct impact on the way occupational health and 
safety has been practiced in this sector and the way that they are addressed (Gardner 
2003).  The main features described by Gardner (2003) are: 
 
 Physical isolation; the installation are mostly isolated and the workers have to 
travel typically by helicopter and stay in the platform for long periods of time. 
Major hazard potential; the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988 tragically illustrates why 
safety is a primary concern of offshore managers.  Offshore platforms are usually 
designed in an extremely compact layout, which has a high density of equipment.  
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In high pressurized systems the potential of accident occurrence and its 
consequences are considerably high. 
 Shift and tour patterns; offshore workers work 12 hours shifts each day to a 
variety of patterns, over a two or three week “tour”, with varying periods of leave 
between tours. 
 Aging workforce; many workers have worked offshore for over 20 years and on 
some installations the average age of the workforce is in the late forties.  The 
effect of aging on an individual’s ability to work in offshore conditions and 
his/her changing vulnerability to health stresses and accidents in the working 
environment has hardly been examined. 
 Multiple exposures; work offshore can involve exposure to a range of hazards 
sequentially or simultaneously (e.g. hazardous substances, noise, vibration, hot or 
cold conditions, heavy manual handling activity are all present on the drill floor). 
Additionally, potential interactions between different stressors such as the ones 
mentioned above have hardly been explored. 
 Environmental concerns; worker exposure to hazardous substances offshore can 
be affected in various ways by environmental concerns.  Thus, the substitution of 
less environmentally hazardous materials can introduce others that are potentially 
more hazardous to the worker.  For example, the removal of various ozone-
depleting chemicals under the Montreal Protocol led in some cases to changes to 
more toxic or asphyxiating, fire-fighting gases (such as carbon dioxide and 
nitrogen). 
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3.3 Occupational Accidents in the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry 
An offshore installation is a complex and expensive engineering structure composed of 
many systems and it is usually unique with its own design and operational characteristics 
(Wang, Sii et al. 2004).  Offshore installations need to constantly adopt new approaches, 
new technologies, new hazardous cargos among others and each of these changes brings a 
new hazard in one form or another.  One of the major challenges in the practical 
application of formal offshore installation safety assessment is associated with the 
development of integrated and flexible approaches to facilitate its application, while 
human and organizational elements significantly influence the safety of the offshore 
installation (Ren, Jenkinson et al. 2009). 
 
In general, occupational accidents in the offshore oil and gas industry can be classified in 
the same way as for any other industry.  The following sections describe briefly the main 
definitions and the classification of accident models and the theories to set the bases for 
this research project. 
 
3.3.1 Accidents and Injuries Definition and Classification 
In general accidents can be defined as a hazard materializing in a sudden probabilistic 
event, or chains of events with adverse consequences (injuries).  Occupational accidents 
are distinguished from other accidents by the facts that they happen in a working life 
context and that the main consequences are limited to injuries on the involved workers.  
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Furthermore, the worker is often the agent as well as the victim of the injury (Hovden, 
Albrechtsen et al. 2010).   
 
Injury and accident are closely related terms and often, the terms are used synonymously 
(Khanzode, Maiti et al. 2012), though they are not synonyms.  Every accident does not 
necessarily result in human injury, but every injury is a result of an incident that can be 
termed as accident.  Causal factors are responsible for transforming injury risk into an 
incident.  The injury level determines how this energy is transferred to the victim’s body 
and what is the severity associated with it.  Based on all this sequence the occupational 
accidents can be divided into five categories (Khanzode, Maiti et al. 2012).  These are: 
 
 hazard identification methods,  
 injury risk assessment methods, 
 accident and injury causation theories 
 injury mechanism, and 
 accident and injury intervention methods. 
 
A summary of each one of this classification is presented in Table 3-1.  This classification 
also presents information regarding other important accident models such as SHIPP 
(Rathnayaka, Khan et al. submitted) and STAMP methods (Leveson 2004). 
17 
 
 
 
Table 3-1 Summary of Occupational and Accident Classification  
Broad area of research Criterion for Classification Category Brief Description 
Hazard identification 
Includes identification of 
hazardous energy sources 
and identification of 
hazardous processes and 
situations in a work 
system. Search technique 
Backward tracking 
 
Forward tracking 
 
Morphological 
Approaches can be further divided in three categories: 
Biased reactive approach, analysed after occurrence of an accident;  
Biased proactive approach, depends heavily in previous knowledge of the 
system, backward and forward tracking methods fall under this category (i.e. 
Fault tree analysis(FTA), Event tree analysis (ETA), cause consequence 
analysis, Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA), Failure Mode Effect and 
Criticality Analysis(FMECA); 
Unbiased proactive approach, hazard analysis is carried out without waiting for 
the events to occur and restrictive hazards assumptions, morphological methods 
fall in this category (i.e. hazard and operability (HAZOP), management 
oversight, risk tree (MORT) and system hazard identification, prediction and 
prevention (SHIPP) methodology. 
Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment involves 
identifying potential 
threats, estimating their 
likelihood, and 
estimating the 
consequences  
Criterion variable 
Indices are employed to 
estimate risk of 
accident/injury 
(descriptive statistic). 
Indices may be Lost-time 
injury frequency rate 
(LTIF), fatal accident rate 
(FAR), etc 
Modeling technique 
Various models are 
proposed for assessing 
accident/injury risk. 
Injury rate 
 
Lost time injury rate 
 
Severity index 
 
Occurrence probability 
 
Statistical distributions 
 
Soft computing 
 
Categorical scales 
Risk assessment methodologies are classified as: Qualitative methods and 
quantitative methods.   
These categories can further be classified as deterministic, probabilistic, and 
combinatorial approaches.  Quantitative methods are suitable when the risks are 
high, costs of detailed analyses are justified, and relevant data is available. The 
results are represented in the form of risk profiles. Qualitative risk assessment 
is more suitable when risks are low and small number of categories can cover 
entire range of consequences and likelihoods.  The results are represented in the 
form of risk matrices.   
Risk assessment process Includes two decisions:  
i)selection of criterion variables, and  
ii) Selection of modeling techniques. 
Accident Causation 
There are a number of 
accident examined by 
researchers over the 
years, these theories and 
models can be divided 
into four generations 
Generation 
Gen-I: Accident 
proneness theory 
 
Gen-II: Domino theory 
 
Gen-III: Injury 
epidemiology 
 
First generation (Gen-I) theories hold a primitive viewpoint towards accident 
causation. These theories hold a person’s traits and unsafe behavior as 
responsible for accident.   
Gen-II theories conceptualize a chain of sequential events leading to an 
accident, and call these events as dominos.   
Gen-III, injury epidemiology approach holds that accident prevention efforts do 
not necessarily lead to injury control in a work system.  Uncontrolled energy 
transfer focused, control at pre-injury, injury and post injury stages.   
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Broad area of research Criterion for Classification Category Brief Description 
Gen-IV: System 
theory STS theory  
Gen IV, Holistic approach, Integrated safety systems.  Interacting social and 
technical subsystems (STS), Job design based on STS principles.  According to 
STS approach, a system is composed of two interacting subsystems: social and 
technical subsystem. Joint optimization of these subsystems leads to better 
performance of the whole system. 
Injury Mechanism 
Injury models attempt to 
explain how the energy 
that is transferred to a 
human body is built in a 
work system, and what 
causes release of 
uncontrolled energy. 
Energy interaction 
Deviation Models 
 
Energy Models 
 
Severity Models 
Deviation models explain injury on the basis of deviations occurring in the 
system variables which lead to release of uncontrolled energy.   
Energy models describe the phases in injury mechanism in slightly different 
terms as compared to deviation models. These phases are: energy build-up 
phase, energy release phase and impact phase.  
Examination of factors affecting injury severity in different work systems is 
helpful in minimizing the severity of impact, and reducing lost man-days under 
a given situation. Factors affecting injury severity are not exactly the same as 
the factors causing injury.  Major and fatal injuries are caused by different 
factors as compared to minor and nonfatal injuries. 
Injury Intervention 
Strategies  
based on the following 
principles:  
(i) isolating the source of 
energy release,  
(ii) separating the source 
and the user in time–
space,  
(iii) providing protecting 
envelope around the user,  
(iv) providing instruction 
and information, so users 
can operate rationally in 
presence of energy 
release. 
Intervention type 
Engineering 
 
Behavioral 
 
Enforcement 
Engineering interventions generally adopt an approach called ‘‘design for 
safety’’ or ‘‘integrating safety into design’’, i.e. personal protective equipment 
(PPE). 
 
Behavioral intervention is related to education and training interventions 
mainly focus on behavioral modification.  Training generally enhances skill and 
knowledge on the job, and is effective in reducing injury if lack of skill or 
knowledge is a strong causal factor for injury.  However lack of skill or 
knowledge is not always a causal factor of injury. 
 
With regard to assessment of enforcement interventions towards injury 
prevention, status of the literature is even poorer.  A few researchers examined 
effects of rules and regulations on occupational safety.  Systems Theoretic 
Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) is an example of it.  The most basic 
concept in STAMP is a constraint, rather than an event.  Traditional accident 
models explain accident causation in terms of a series of events, while STAMP 
views accidents as the result of a lack of constraints (control laws) imposed on 
the system design and during operational deployment. 
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3.4 Risk Relevant Definitions and Concepts 
3.4.1 Definition of Risk: 
A hazard is considered the source of danger, but the concept itself does not contain any 
notion of the likelihood.  It is often uncertain whether or not a hazard will actually lead to 
negative consequences.  The hazard probability can be quantified.  Then, the definition of 
risk combines both elements “hazard” and “probability” (Bedford and Cooke 2001).   
 
Mathematically, risk can be expressed as a function of hazard and exposure from risk 
agents causing adverse probabilistic consequences to a receptor, which can be human 
beings, ecosystem, environment or property. 
 
R= f(hazard, likelihood of exposure, and impact of hazard) 
 
ISpR   
Where: 
R = Risk 
p = Probability of occurrence of an unwanted event 
S = Consequence or severity of occurrence of an unwanted event 
I = Impact of hazard 
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As shown above, the level of risk is dependent on the degree of hazard as well as on the 
amount of safeguards or preventive measures against adverse effects.  Since risk is 
expressed as the probability of occurrence; therefore, uncertainty evaluation plays an 
important role in quantifying risk. 
 
Kaplan and Garrick (1981) further refined the notion of risk in the following way:  
Instead of talking about the probability of an event, they talk about the “frequency” with 
which such an event might take place.  They then introduce the notion of uncertainty 
about the frequency which gives a more sophisticated notion of risk.  
 
3.4.2 Definition of Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is the overall process of identifying the sources of potential harm 
(hazard) and assessing; the seriousness (consequences or loss criticality), the exposure to 
any hazard, the likelihood of any adverse outcome that may arise, and the safety level.  It 
is based on hazard, consequence, exposure, likelihood, and safety level assessments 
leading to an estimation of risk. 
 
Kaplan and Garrick (1981) suggested that risk is most usefully considered as a narrative 
that answers three questions:  
 What can happen? 
 How likely is it to happen? 
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 If it does happen, what are the consequences? 
 
Therefore, an estimate of the level of risk whether qualitative (negligible, low, moderate, 
substantial, high or very high) or quantitative, is derived from the likelihood, exposure, 
consequences the scenarios that arise from identified hazards.  In addition, uncertainty 
about likelihood, exposure, and consequences of each scenario will affect the individual 
estimates of risk.  Figure 3-1 illustrates the iterative process of risk assessment and risk 
reduction.  
 
 
Figure 3-1 Iterative Process of Risk Assessment and Reduction (ISO/IEC, 1999) 
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The purpose of risk assessment under the international regulations is to identify risks to 
human health and other environmental targets and estimate the level of risk based on 
scientific evidence.  Risk analysis can be applied to many different types of risk.  
Different methodologies have been proposed to assess different risks (WHO 2009).  
Assessment of risks to health and safety often takes the form of hazard identification, 
dose-response assessment and exposure assessment leading to risk characterization.  
 
Risk assessment methodologies are mostly classified as: i) qualitative methods, and ii) 
quantitative methods or the combination of both iii) semi-quantitative methods.  These 
categories can further be classified as deterministic, probabilistic, and combinatorial 
approaches (Radu 2009; Khanzode, Maiti et al. 2012). 
 
3.4.2.1 Qualitative Risk Assessment  
Qualitative risk assessment is more suitable when risks are low and small number of 
categories can cover entire range of consequences and likelihoods (Khanzode, Maiti et al. 
2012).  Nonetheless, occupational qualitative risk assessment should be a systematic 
examination of what in the workplace could cause harm to people, so that decisions can 
be made as to whether existing precautions or control measures are adequate or whether 
more needs to be done to prevent harm (Radu 2009).  Health and Safety England has 
published guidance on carrying out simple, qualitative assessments in the booklet ‘Five 
steps to risk assessment’ (HSE UK 2011).  Based on their recommendations, the steps to 
follow a qualitative assessment are: 
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 Identify the hazards. 
 Identify the possible consequences (decide who might be harmed and how). 
 Evaluate risk (and decide whether the existing precautions are adequate or 
whether more should be done). 
 Record the findings. 
 Review your assessment and revise if necessary. 
 
The results of a qualitative risk assessment are usually represented in the form of risk 
matrices where occurrence probability and consequence severity represent the two axes 
(Khanzode, Maiti et al. 2012).   
 
Table 3-2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Qualitative Risk Assessment 
Advantages of Qualitative Risk Assessment Disadvantages of qualitative Risk 
Assessment 
 Allow the determination of areas of 
greater risk in a short time and without 
bigger expenditure 
 The results cannot be expressed in 
numerical measures, therefore does not 
allow for determination of probabilities 
 the analysis is relatively easy and cheap  Cost benefit analysis is more difficult 
due to the lack of numerical values 
  The results have a general character, 
approximate. 
 
3.4.2.2 Semi-quantitative Risk Assessment 
Semi-quantitative risk assessment provides an intermediary level between the textual 
evaluation of qualitative risk assessment and the numerical evaluation of quantitative risk 
assessment, by evaluating risks with a score.  Semi-quantitative risk assessment is more 
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suitable in intermediate cases where the hazards are neither few nor simple, nor numerous 
and complex.  In those conditions, it may be appropriate to supplement the simple 
qualitative approach with a semi-quantitative assessment (Radu 2009). 
 
In carrying out semi-quantitative risk assessments, simple qualitative techniques may be 
enhance by the use of simple modeling techniques.  These simple modeling techniques 
can help to estimate the severity of the consequences and the likelihood of hazards.  
Finally, these estimates can be combined to obtain estimates of the associated risk.  A 
number of different techniques for carrying out semi-quantitative risk assessments exist, 
including risk matrix approaches and lines of defence/layers of protection analysis. 
 
Table 3-3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Semi-quantitative Risk Assessment 
Advantages of Semi-quantitative Risk 
Assessment 
Disadvantages of Semi-quantitative Risk 
Assessment 
 It offers a more consistent and rigorous 
approach to assess risks and risk 
management strategies than the 
qualitative risk assessment techniques 
 avoids some of the greater ambiguities 
that a qualitative risk  assessment may 
produce 
 It does not require the same 
mathematical skills as quantitative risk 
assessment, nor does it require the 
same amount of data, which means it 
can be applied to risks and strategies 
where precise data are missing
 The risks are placed into usually quite 
broad sets of categories.  It is therefore 
imperative that the categories are 
carefully constructed. 
 
 Using the semi-quantitative risk 
assessment scoring system as a 
surrogate for probability calculations is 
likely to cause severe inaccuracies 
when one assesses a longer sequence of 
events.
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3.4.2.3 Quantitative Risk Assessment 
Quantitative risk assessment requires the estimation of frequency and consequence 
severity in quantitative terms.  This approach is suitable when the risks are high, costs of 
detailed analyses are justified, and relevant data are available.  The results are represented 
in the form of risk profiles (Khanzode, Maiti et al. 2012).   
 
Table 3-4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Quantitative Risk Assessment 
Advantages of Quantitative Risk Assessment Disadvantages of Quantitative Risk Assessment 
 Allows assessing consequences of 
incidents occurrence in quantitative 
way; so, facilitates realization of costs 
and benefit analysis during selection of 
protections measures. 
 
 They give more accurate image of risk 
 Analysis conducted with application of 
those methods is generally more 
expensive, demanding greater 
experience, high technical skills and 
advanced tools. 
 
 Quantitative measures depend on the 
scope and accuracy of defined 
measurement scale 
 
 It is case specific 
 
Quantitative risk assessment can be further divided into two approaches: deterministic 
and probabilistic.  Both approaches have an important role in the quantitative risk analysis 
performed for decision making purposes; both methods have advantages and 
disadvantages.  However, one method will have priority over the other; depending on 
how quantitative are decisions to be made, available data, and the scope of the project.   
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3.5 Highlights of Relevant Occupational Risk Assessment Models 
In this section of the report four different quantitative approaches to address occupational 
accidents in the offshore O&G industry are summarized and compared.  A summary table 
with the results is presented after the description of each one of the models. 
 
3.5.1 Modeling Offshore Safety Focusing on Human Organization Factors (Ren, 
Jenkinson et al. 2009) 
Ren, Jenkinson et al. (2008) proposed a methodology to model causal relationships 
among multiple risk factors for offshore operations.  The paper states the importance of 
addressing HOFs in accident modeling based on various studies where it has been shown 
that HOFs contribute to: 75% of fires and explosions, 89-86% of collisions, 79% of 
towing vessel groundings and 84-88% of tanker accidents.  The approach used in the 
paper is described in the following sections. 
 
3.5.1.1 Model Overview 
The model proposes a combination of approaches between the Reason's “Swiss cheese” 
model (Ren, Jenkinson et al. 2008), to form a generic offshore safety assessment 
framework; and Bayesian Network (BN) that is fitted into the framework to construct a 
causal relationship model.  The proposed framework uses a five-level-structure model to 
address latent failures within the causal sequence of events (Figure 3-2).  The five levels 
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include Root causes level, Trigger events level, Incidents level, Accidents level, and 
Consequences level as shown in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 3-2 The Conceptual Model for HOFs (Ren, Jenkinson et al. 2008) 
 
To analyze and model the safety of a specific offshore installation, a BN model is used 
following the guideline of the proposed five-level framework.  A range of events was 
specified, and the related prior and conditional probabilities regarding the BN model, 
were assigned based on the inherent characteristics of each event.  As a result, numerical 
values of occurrence likelihood for each failure event are calculated.  To show the 
applicability of the model a case study of the collision risk between a Floating Production 
Storage and Offloading (FPSO) unit and authorized vessels caused by HOFs during 
operations is used to illustrate an industrial application of this particular methodology. 
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3.5.1.2 Justification of the approach 
The paper states that offshore accidents occur through the concatenation of multiple latent 
errors.  An individual error may not be sufficient to cause severe consequences unless it 
occurs in combination with other latent errors.   
 
Based on human behavior and organizational theory, literature proposes the “Swiss 
Cheese” model to study HOFs (see Figure 3-3).  Each slide of the Swiss Cheese model 
represent a safety barrier or precaution relevant to a particular hazard.  The holes in the 
cheese slices represent a latent errors (human error, equipment failure, etc.) waiting to 
happen.  The defensive barriers are like dynamic slices of Swiss Cheese against accidents 
and incidents, with the holes constantly subject to changes in size and location.  When the 
holes line up, meaning that all the defenses fail and a system’s latent vulnerabilities are 
exposed, then an incident occurs.  A significant attribute of Reson’s model is that each of 
the contributing factors is seen as necessary but no sufficient on its own to cause the 
occurrence of an accident.  However, the Swiss Cheese model is mainly criticized for 
being simply a conceptual model with few details on how to apply in a real-world setting.  
This particular weakness can be overcome by BNs that are capable of providing graphical 
demonstration of inter-relationships as well as numerical values of occurrence likelihood 
for each failure event. 
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Figure 3-3 Swiss Cheese Model (Ren, Jenkinson et al. 2008) 
 
BN has been increasingly recognized as a powerful tool to support causal inference in 
situations where data for analysis is with high level of uncertainty, and certainly HOFs 
involve a high level of uncertainty.  The paper describes how BN is capable of replicating 
the essential features of plausible reasoning in a consistent, efficient and mathematically 
sound way.  BN is mainly criticized for lack of guidelines in establishing a causal model, 
that is, modeling is heavily dependent on expert’s personal experiences and is therefore 
highly domain specific.  The “Swiss cheese” model is such a theoretical framework based 
on solid behavioral theory and therefore can be used to provide a roadmap for BN 
modeling.  
 
3.5.1.3 Conclusions 
Offshore installation usually operates in dynamic environments in which technical human 
and organizational malfunctions may cause accidents.  As such, HOFs should be 
Some holes due to active failures 
Other holes due to latent conditions 
Successive layers of defences, barriers and safeguards 
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considered in any safety assessment.  The case study shows that Reason’s “Swiss cheese” 
model and BN can be jointly used in offshore safety assessment. 
 
The paper states that BN uses probability measure to assess uncertainty and thus requires 
precise information in the form of prior and conditional probability tables. Such 
information is often difficult or impossible to obtain; in particular, when dealing with 
indirect relationships.  In those cases, verbal expressions such as very unlikely for 
example could be more appropriate than numerical values.  Therefore, the paper proposes 
that the future work should be to investigate the possibility of merging BN and fuzzy 
logic to conduct Bayesian reasoning to facilitate offshore risk analysis.  The merging of 
BN and fuzzy logic has already been done (Musharraf, Hassan et al. 2013), this particular 
research has been detailed further in this document. 
 
3.5.2 Quantifying Occupational Risk – ORM Model (Ale, Baksteen et al. 2008) 
Ale, Baksteen et al. (2008) constrcuted of a model called Occupational Risk Model 
(ORM).  The ORM is a result of a project requested by the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
employment of Netherlands (SZW).  It was expected that with this model, industries and 
experts can evaluate the occupational risk for the individual workers, companies and 
projects.   
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3.5.2.1 Model Overview 
The ORM model is a further development of previous work executed with support of 
SZW and the European Union, such as IRISK and AVRIM.  The model has as an 
objective to support the specifications of the SZW policy.  The policy requires 
quantitative analysis of risk, determination of dominant paths to accidents from these 
quantifications, analysis of underlying scenarios, and reduction of risk by addressing the 
dominant threats first and by using the most cost effective method of risk reduction. 
 
3.5.2.2 Justification of the Approach 
The quantification of occupational risk is approached in a similar fashion as the approach 
taken when calculating the risk of a chemical plant.  The risk profile of a chemical plant is 
constructed from the risks of its components: vessels, pipes, reactors etc.  The risk 
associated to a task is constructed from the risks associated with the hazards a worker has 
to face when he or she performs his work.  Therefore, the work profiles were decomposed 
according to the data of accident statistics in Netherlands.  From these records a list of 
hazards or causes of accidents are derived.  This list is partly based on a classification of 
accident types used by the Labor Inspectorate in their reporting on occupational 
accidents, the classifications form the UK and the classification from previous Dutch 
studies. 
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The list plays a very important role, since it is required for linking activities and hazards 
to construct the risk profile of a task or a particular work title.  Through activities and 
hazard list the risk profile for this work-title is constructed by adding the exposures to 
each of the associated hazards for a full year of employment.  The risk of an entire 
company can then be constructed by combining the risk of the work titles in the company 
rated according to the number of job positions with that title (Figure 3-4).  The resulting 
risk can be expressed in a wide range of possible metrics.  However, the data used will 
define risk in its own units (i.e. death, permanent injury and reversible injury). 
 
Company, jobs, hazards and Bow-ties Job profile, exposure, Bow-tie and risk 
Figure 3-4 Schematic Representation of the Methodology of the Model Presented by Ale, 
Baksteen et al. (2008) 
 
Using the list of hazard types as a starting point, the scenarios are systematically analyzed 
into the chain linking cause with consequences.  For this purpose the Storybuilder model 
was developed.  Storybuilder is part of the ORM software that organizes the inspector’s 
reports around single centre events, which are the materialization of the hazards form the 
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hazard list.  Thus, Storybuild is constructed for falling from ladders, being hit by falling 
objects or other scenarios.  The Storybuilds developed for this project can be found online 
(www.storybuilder.eu).  The Storybuilds give information about the make-up of the 
accident and about the distribution of causes and causal chains given that an accident of a 
certain type occurs.  The way that the model works is closely related to the way the risk is 
logically modeled.  The relationship between an accident and its possible causes is often 
given as a fault tree.  The relationship between an accident and its potential consequences 
is often depicted as an event tree.  Coupling both trees at the accident link a Bow-tie 
shaped diagram results (small bow-ties relations are shown on Figure 3-4).  In order to be 
able to link the Bow-ties with the Storybuilds, the structure of the scenario analyses is 
shaped in the form of a barrier analysis.  
 
The risk reduction then can be carried out by taking measures.  Measures influence the 
risk and this is reflected in a change in the probabilities of blocks in the logical diagram to 
be in one of their states.  The smallest possible unit of change in the total risk picture of a 
company is called a probability influencing entity or (PIE).  Measures can result from 
rules and regulations to improve compliance, measures can also be technical.  Measures 
and PIES in ORM are defined by two parameters: the effect on probability and the 
associated cost. 
 
Finally the optimizer combines the information on the Dutch national average, the 
information supplied by the user on his specific situation and the information on PIEs - 
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probability effect and cost –to seek out the optimal combination for risk reduction.  From 
the results the user can choose a combination of cost and risk according to his needs. 
Figure 3-5 depicts the relations of the three constituents of the ORM (Story builder, Bow-
tie builder, and optimizer)  
 
 
Figure 3-5 The basic ORM Components (Ale, Baksteen et al. 2008) 
 
3.5.2.3 Conclusions 
The ORM model is a further development of quantification techniques.  The model is 
developed for use by enterprises and governments in developing strategies to further 
reduce occupational risk. 
 
3.5.3 Reliability Base Model for Occupational Accidents (Attwood 2006) 
Attwood (2006) developed a reliability based model for occupational accident in the 
offshore oil and gas industry.  The model is a holistic quantitative approach.  The 
objectives of the model are: predict the likelihood of occupational accidents on a specific 
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offshore platform, estimate accident rate within this industry sector and, provide a means 
to effectively direct resources to key entities of the model to produce optimal safety 
results.  
 
3.5.3.1 Model Overview: 
During his investigation Attwood (2006) found the existence of corporate and regional 
differences in safety performance.  Therefore, the model considers three groups of factors 
or layers, as the ones affecting accident frequency (External layer, Corporate layer and 
Direct layer). The approach of the model is based on a chain of influence between the 
layers; originating with external factors, which act through corporate elements, to affect 
factors directly influencing the accident process (refer to Figure 3-6).  Each one of the 
factors is described below: 
 
 Direct Factors: include individual staff behaviors and capabilities, weather, safety 
design, and personal protective equipment 
 Corporate Factors: provided by the supporting organization, including the level 
and quality of safety procedures, training, and culture. 
 External Factors: such as societal value placed on life and financial pressure such 
as shareholder pressure, price of oil, and royalty regime. 
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Figure 3-6 Basic Schematic of the Reliability Based Model (Attwood 2006) 
 
3.5.3.2 Justification of the Approach 
The accident process was modeled using a modified reliability network.  Daryl Attwood’s 
investigations lead to the recognition that there are several similarities between the 
components and interconnections of a mechanical/electrical engineering system 
(Attwood, Khan et al. 2006). 
 
As such, the overall system is subdivided into sub-systems, where the arrangement of 
elements are either in series (i.e. weather, safety design and PPE) or parallel (i.e. the 
elements that comprise physical capability; coordination, fitness and lack of fatigue).  The 
complete internal arrangement of the elements in the model is shown on Figure 3-7. 
 
37 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-7 Internal Arrangement of the Elements in the Model (Attwood 2006) 
 
The model proposed by the author accounts for the fact that not all elements affect overall 
safety performance to the same degree.  As such, the author gathered expert opinion in 
quantitative manner (survey questionnaire), from forty five offshore safety professionals.  
The experts were asked to rate relative importance of elements using a one (not very 
important at all) to ten (crucial) scale.  This information was used in two topics: 
 
 The relative importance of factors influencing the accident process (Strength 
values) and, 
 The degrees to which external factors affect corporate decisions, and to which the 
corporate decisions in turn affect the direct accident process (Influence 
coefficients). 
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The accident frequency prediction process requires the model run in two distinct modes.  
First, a calibration run is executed, where known accident rates are used to determine base 
case component reliabilities.  Second, the model is run in predictive mode following 
adjustment of the base case reliabilities.  The degree of adjustment is determined using a 
quantified comparison of safety conditions in the specific and base cases, which requires 
expert input from safety personnel familiar with both situations.  In many applications, 
the global average safety situation is used as the base case.  The overall visualization of 
the model is shown in Figure 3-8. 
 
The model approach assumes a relatively constant failure rate model for the reliability 
calculation.  This assumption is based on the trends of current statistical data such as fatal 
accident rate (FAR), injury rate (TRIR), among other safety indicators.  Attwood (2006) 
states that the safety indicators (FAR, TRIR) have reached a relatively constant state, 
meaning events are occurring as a random process.  The calculation of the system 
reliability starts with the calibration of the model.  For this process global average data 
can be used in order to determine the reliability value of each one of the components of 
the network.   
0,exp)(
0


  tedttR tt 
 
Where: 
R= system reliability at time t 
λ= average failure (accident) rate 
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Once the system reliability has been calculated, the expected number of accidents for a 
unit time (usually taken as one year) is calculated according to the reliability formula 
shown below: 
)(RLn  
Assuming a constant failure rate, then, the Poisson distribution proposes the following 
equation to calculate the probability of “x” occurrences in a unit time (one year in this 
example). 
!x
eP
x
x
 
 
Where: 
Px= Probability of “x” occurrences 
λ= Average or expected number of occurrences (that can be obtain from running the 
model) 
 
Figure 3-8 Visualization of the Model Inputs and Outputs 
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3.5.3.3 Conclusions 
The model can be used by offshore oil and gas safety professionals in any of the 
following ways: 
 
 To predict occupational accident frequency under any unique safety environment. 
 To observe improvements in results achievable with changes in input conditions 
(either individual elements or groups).  Thereby facilitating optimal management 
decisions. These changes can result from either change in asset status, or 
conscious adjustments in safety philosophy. 
 To set realistic safety targets for minimizing overall risk. 
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3.5.4 Human Reliability Assessment During Offshore Emergency Conditions 
(Musharraf, Hassan et al. 2013) 
3.5.4.1 Model Overview 
Musharraf, Hassan et al. (2013) presented a quantitative approach to Human Reliability 
Analysis (HRA) during emergency conditions in an offshore environment.  This research 
recognizes that most of the available HRA methodologies are based on expert judgment 
techniques due to the lack of human error data for emergency conditions.  Nonetheless, 
expert judgment may introduce uncertainly and incompleteness which are usually not 
taken into account in the analysis.  Thus, the objective of this research is to address the 
issue of handling uncertainty associated with expert judgment.  This paper assesses the 
Human Error Probability (HEP) during different phases of an emergency using a 
Bayesian Network (BN) approach integrated with an evidence theory approach.  As part 
of the validation, this methodology is compared with the analytical approach called: 
Success Likelihood Index Methodology (SLIM).  Some advantages of this model are: the 
flexibility of updating new information as it becomes available, and the capacity of 
representing complex interactions. 
 
3.5.4.2 Justification of the Approach 
The assessment of Human reliability or Human Error Probability (HEP) is important in 
order to improve the design of more effective safety systems and emergency management 
systems.  This research recognizes that there is a lack of human error data for emergency 
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conditions.  Therefore, most of the available HRA methodologies are based on expert 
judgment techniques.  
 
Today, there are several Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) methods developed and used 
(Musharraf, Hassan et al. 2013).  However, as identified by this research these HRA 
techniques have two very important limitations: 
 
 First, they are unable to handle uncertainty and inconsistency associated with 
expert judgment. 
 Second, the majority of these techniques assume unrealistic independence among 
human factors and associated actions. 
 
Therefore the objective of this paper is to improve current HRA analysis by addressing 
these limitations.  The methodology is developed and validated by assessing Human Error 
Probability (HEP) for offshore emergency situation.   
 
The lack of real data for the analysis of human error makes necessary the inclusion of 
expert judgment to the analysis, examples of which are Success Likelihood Index 
Methodology (SLIM) and Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) models.  
Expert judgment from a single expert may be biased and incomplete, and therefore 
insufficient or inappropriate for a reliable human error prediction.  This research proposes 
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the use of evidence theory to combine multi-expert knowledge and hence increase the 
reliability of human error prediction. 
 
 
Figure 3-9 Methodology Flowchart (Adopted from Musharraf, Hassan et al. (2013) 
 
The first step of Human Reliability Assessment as proposed by this paper is to focus on 
human behavior and identify a set of human factors believed to be related to the worker 
performance.  These factors are called the human Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs).  
This research states that, the conditions or circumstances under which an event occurs are 
influenced by underlying dependency and contextual factors.  In addition, the tasks 
performed in an emergency scenario (such as in an offshore emergency situation) are 
interdependent and have relations that must be taken into consideration.  Individuals have 
to perform a sequence of tasks and the outcome of one task generally affects the task that 
follows.   
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Therefore, BN is used to represent the relationships among human factors and associated 
actions in a hierarchical structure.  The network represents external relations of PSFs and 
associated actions, rather than internal dependencies among PSFs themselves. An 
advantage of the model is that the network enables dynamic updating through emerging 
information. 
 
The methodology starts with the scenario analysis. At the end of this step the scenario is 
divided into smaller phases.  A total of 17 tasks were identified that are broken down into 
four muster phases:  
 
Table 3-5 Muster Action Broken Down by Muster Phase (Table Constructed From Work of 
Musharraf, Hassan et al. (2013) 
Master phases Tasks 
Awareness phase 
1) detect alarm 
2) identified alarm 
3) act accordingly  
Evaluation phase 
4) Ascertain if danger is imminent 
5) Muster if in imminent danger 
6) Return process equipment to safe state 
7) Make workplace as safe as possible in limited time 
Egress phase 
8) Listen and follow PA 
9) Evaluate potential egress paths and choose route 
10) Move along egress route 
11) Assess quality of egress route while moving to TSR 
12) Choose alternate route if egress path is not tenable 
13) Assist others if needed or as directed 
Recovery phase 
14) Register at TSR 
15) Provide pertinent feedback attained while en-route to TSR 
16) Don personal survival suit or TSR survival suit if instructed to 
abandon 
17) Follow OIM instructions 
 
45 
 
 
 
Then for each phase listed above, PSFs influencing human performance are identified.  
For example, in the awareness phase, the skills required to detect the alarm, identify the 
alarm and act accordingly are listed and from that list specific PSF are identified. 
An example of the identification of PSF for the task "detect alarm" is as follows: 
 
Table 3-6 Example of the Identification of PSF for the Task "Detect Alarm" 
Task/Action Skill Required Identified PSF 
Detect alarm 1) Concentration 2) Perception 
Distraction, stress 
Distraction (noise), physical condition 
 
The prior knowledge of each PSF comes from different expert sources in terms of basic 
probability assignments and they are combined using evidence theory (DST).  Using the 
same process, the prior probabilities of each PSF of the model are obtained.  With the 
support of causal dependency in each phase and the probabilities obtained in the PSF 
assessment stage, BNs are developed for each task.  BNs are updated each time there is 
new information or evidence available.  As a result, the likelihood of task failure and 
corresponding Human Error Probability (HEP) are finally calculated.  This process is 
repeated for all phases identified during scenario analysis. 
 
3.5.4.3 Conclusions 
The research approach has proved to be simple and effective in assessing human error 
likelihood.  In addition, the methodology provides the flexibility of dynamic updating the 
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BN with emerging evidence.  Precise estimates of human error using this method could 
help to design more effective emergency management systems. 
 
3.5.5 Comparison of the Described Relevant Models 
A comparison of the four models has been carried out the results are presented in Table 
3-7 
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Table 3-7 Comparison Table for Described Relevant Models 
Model name Approached used Model capabilities Advantages Disadvantages 
Modeling 
Offshore 
safety 
focusing on 
human and 
organizational 
factors(HOs) 
Combination of 
Swiss cheese for a 
generic 
assessment 
framework and 
Bayesian Network 
to build a causal 
relationship 
* Calculation of the 
probability of a 
particular accident in 
the offshore industry.  
*Safety Assessment of 
the particular offshore 
installation. 
*Considers the influence of human and 
organizational factors in the accident process 
*Introduces expert opinion  which helps to 
update constantly the ever-changing 
environment of offshore installations 
*The Bayesian approach (probabilistic) helps 
to deal with the high level of uncertainty 
existing in the offshore industry. 
 
*The model relies on expert opinion 
which is not always easy to have access 
to. 
*BN requires precise information in the 
form of prior and conditional probability 
tables often very difficult to obtain as 
numerical values. 
Quantifying 
Occupational 
Risk model 
(ORM) 
 
Bow-tie approach 
(combination of 
fault trees and 
event trees), plus 
barrier analysis to 
link storybuilder 
with bow-tie  
*Quantitative analysis 
of risk. 
*Determination of 
dominant paths to 
accidents 
*Calculation of most 
cost effective method 
for risk reduction 
*The model has a strong capability and 
flexibility to be adapted to various industries 
and different working conditions. 
*The model can estimate most cost effective 
approach for accident reduction. 
*The model uses a very well set of data 
collected for the government agencies. 
*The model is available for public domain. 
*The model has a probabilistic approach that 
helps to deal with the level of uncertainty 
related to the field. 
*The model is run based on historical 
data of all accidents disregarding the 
industry of origin, as such predictability 
can be very coarse specially in particular 
scenarios such as offshore installations. 
*Very accurate data is required to link the 
story builder with the bow-tie model. 
“The state of the barrier that fail” and 
they were thought to be relevant are 
reported by the inspectors of safety.  This 
information contains lots of uncertainty 
and in lots of cases has to be inferred.    
 
Reliability 
base model 
for 
occupational 
accidents 
 
Modified 
reliability network 
*Prediction of 
occupational accident 
frequency 
* Determination of 
components that can 
improve the overall 
safety of the system 
*The model has a holistic approach, 
considers the influence of societal factors, 
organizational factors and factors directly 
related with the overall system 
*Introduces expert opinion  which helps to 
update constantly the ever-changing 
environment of offshore installations 
*The model is field specific design for 
offshore operations 
*The model it is relatively simple to 
*The model relies strongly on expert 
opinion which is not always easy to have 
access to. 
*The model relies of the assumption of 
constant failure rates for the reliability 
calculation which is not always true. 
*The capability for prediction in a long 
term is limited  
* The accuracy of the prediction depends 
largely in expert opinion. 
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Model name Approached used Model capabilities Advantages Disadvantages 
understand and apply  *It uses a determinist approach increasing 
level of uncertainty 
Human 
reliability 
assessment 
during 
offshore 
emergency 
conditions 
 
Bayesian Network 
(BN) approach 
integrated with 
evidence theory 
approach. 
*Prediction of Human 
error likelihood for a 
better design of 
emergency 
management systems. 
 
*The model is relatively simple and effective 
for human error likelihood prediction. 
*The model represents the relation among 
internal human factors and associated 
actions. 
*The methodology is flexible and dynamic 
and capable of updating the BN with 
emerging evidence.  
 
*The model relies on expert opinion 
which is not always easy to have access 
to. 
*BN requires precise information in the 
form of prior and conditional probability 
tables often very difficult to obtain as 
numerical values. 
*The model only takes internal human 
factors into account. External factors are 
not considered in the current model. 
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4 RESEARCH METHODOLGY 
This research aims at defining a quantitative approach for the estimation of occupational 
risk for offshore operations using a probabilistic framework.  Attwood (2006) developed 
a reliability model for the quantification of occupational accidents in the offshore oil and 
gas industry (accident frequency).  Despite of its novelty, the model relies on 
deterministic parameters as input values.  Therefore, to enhance the Reliability Based 
Model, the use of probabilistic inputs is proposed.  The probabilistic approach 
subsequently lead to the development of an occupational risk model. 
 
Probabilistic inputs would more realistically represent the uncertainty associated with the 
parameters used in the model.  Monte Carlo simulations will be used as a tool to establish 
a probability distribution of output results.  The output then can be converted into an 
incident rate value using central limit theorem.  Once the consequences are determine and 
characterized, occupational accident risk will be calculated.   
 
This chapter is divided in two parts.  First, the original Reliability Model (quantitative 
deterministic approach) as proposed by Attwood (2006) is briefly described to have an 
understanding of the model.  Second, the methodology proposed by this research for the 
modification of the Reliability Model (quantitative probabilistic approach) to improve and 
extend original model is presented.  
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4.1 The Reliability Model Proposed by Attwood (2006) 
4.1.1 Model Overview, Justification, and Objectives 
The “Reliability based model for occupational accident in the offshore oil and gas 
industry”, developed by Daryl Attwood is a holistic quantitative model that covers the 
gap of quantitative models in the occupational accident risk in offshore process 
operations.  The model uses a reliability approach and is capable of: 
 
 predicting the likelihood of occupational accidents on an specific offshore 
platform, 
 estimating accident rate within an industry sector and, 
 providing the means to effectively direct resources deployment to produce optimal 
safety results.  
 
The model considers three groups of factors (layers), which affect accident frequency:  
External Layer, Corporate Layer and Direct Layer.  The approach is based on a chain of 
influence between the layers; originating with external factors, which act through 
corporate elements, to affect factors directly influencing the accident process (refer to 
Figure 3-6 and Section 3.5.3). 
 
4.1.2 The Model Structure 
World wide data (statistical data and graphical representation) of offshore occupational 
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accidents were analyzed and studied by Attwood (2006), to confirm one of the model 
principles: the existence of corporate and regional differences in safety performance.  
Therefore, the model was structured as a three layer model as shown in Figure 3-6 (Refer 
to Section 3.5.3.1).  The basic premise of the model is stated as:   
 
“Occupational accidents result from an unsatisfactory direct interaction between worker 
and the workplace environment provided by an organization whose actions were, in turn 
influenced by external elements”.  Given the premises above, the model was structured 
considering the specific elements showed in Figure 4-1 and the relation between them. 
 
External Layer Corporate Support Layer Direct Layer 
Value placed on life by 
society 
Corporate safety 
culture Individual behaviour 
Attitude 
Financial 
Drivers 
Price of oil Safety training programme 
Motivation 
 
Shareholder 
pressure Safety procedures 
Individual 
capability 
Mental 
Knowledge 
Royalty 
regime 
 
 
Intelligence 
 
 
 Physical 
Coordination 
Fitness  
Lack of fatigue 
Weather 
Safety design 
Personal Protective Equipment 
Figure 4-1 Specific Elements of the Model (Adopted From Attwood, 2006) 
4.1.3 Model Elements Description 
The reliability model consist of specific elements divided in three layers or categories.  
The layers of the model are described as follows: 
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4.1.3.1 Direct Layer 
The direct layer considers the factors directly affecting accident likelihood.  These factors 
are: weather conditions, safety related design of the work place, quality of protective 
equipment and workers behavior and capabilities.  The first three factors mentioned 
above are direct inputs to the model.  However, worker behavior and capabilities factors 
require more detail analysis due to the complexity to express them numerically.  
Therefore, it has been subdivided in other categories as shown in Figure 4-2.  The 
description of each of the specific elements considered for the model input is as follows: 
 
 Weather conditions: average weather conditions at the work place. 
 Safety related design of the work place: takes into account the type of facility (oil 
or gas) and related work environment. 
 Quality of protective equipment (PPE): supplied by the company i.e. hat, boots, 
safety glasses, and earplugs. 
 Attitude: can be defined using the statement that good safety attitudes will 
produce direct benefits and general improvement of overall corporate safety 
culture.  Attitude can be positively influenced by the organization through 
encouragement and engagement. 
 Motivation: to operate in a safe manner must be clearly provided by management 
and supervisors (corporate layer) trough means of positive reinforcement and 
penalties. 
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 Knowledge: component that comprises of the safety related information retained 
by the worker following training sessions. 
 Intelligence: component that allows the worker to cope with safety issues not 
specifically covered by training and procedures. 
 Coordination: reasonable degree to perform the task. 
 Fitness: reasonable degree to perform the task. 
 Lack of fatigue: reasonable degree to perform the task. 
 
The specific elements consider for the model input, mentioned above are the ones in 
colour in Figure 4-2. 
 
 
Figure 4-2 Elements Corresponding to the Direct Layer of the Model 
 
CapabilitiesBehaviour
Attitude Motivation Mental Capabilities Physical Capabilities
Knowledge Intelligence Coordination Fitness Lack of fatigue
worker behaviour and capabilitiesQuality of protective 
equipment (PPE)
Safety related design 
of work place
Weather Conditions
Direct Layer
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4.1.3.2 Corporate Layer 
The corporate layer is the safety related support provided by the organization. The factors 
considered in this layer are: 
 
 Corporate safety culture: nurtured by the organization (difficult to quantify). 
Today offshore operators take many practical steps to ensure that the basic 
elements required for safe work activities are in place.  These include the 
development of safety training programs and the distribution of safety procedures 
and guidance notes. 
 Safety training: delivered to the staff; the author mentions that maintaining an 
appropriate balance in the intensity and quantity of training sessions and 
procedures has a crucial importance. 
 Procedures: Offered to reduce accident risk. 
 
4.1.3.3 External Layer 
Attwood (2006) supports taking into account this factor since cultural expectations differ 
enormously throughout the world.  As such, region-specific societal forces will affect 
corporate safety results in several ways.  The factors considered in this layer are the value 
on human life and the financial drivers.  As Figure 4-3 shows, the financial drivers’ factor 
is subdivided into three other elements.  The specific elements considered for the model 
input are the ones coloured in Figure 4-3. 
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Figure 4-3 Elements Corresponding to the External Layer of the Model 
 
The description of each of the specific elements considered for the model input is as 
follows: 
 
 Value of human Life: this may vary considerably among different regions. 
Operators will receive through regulatory process, a relatively high pressure to 
impose strict safety programs in regions where human life has a higher value.  The 
opposite relative effect will be found in regions where human life has 
comparatively lower societal value. 
 
 Price of oil: Attwood (2006) found a strong inverse correlation between price of 
oil and accident frequency.  This may be interpreted as when money is scarce 
there is an increase pressure on the quality of the safety programs enacted by the 
operators. 
 
 Shareholder pressure: related to the degree to which an organization feels pressure 
from its ultimate owner to improve bottom line performance. 
External Layer
Value on human Life Finantial Drivers
Price of Oil Shareholder preassure Royalty Regime
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 Royalty regime: it is heavily region-specific.  Strict royalty regimes erode project 
profitability which in turns may produce an undesirable negative effect in safety 
performance. 
 
4.1.4 Structure of the Model  
The accident process was modeled using a modified reliability network.  Attwood’s 
investigations lead to the recognition that there are several similarities between the 
components and interconnections of a mechanical/electrical engineering system.  As such, 
the overall system is subdivided into sub-systems, where the arrangement of elements are 
either in series (i.e. weather, safety design and PPE) or parallel (i.e. the elements that 
comprise physical capability; coordination, fitness and lack of fatigue).  The complete 
internal arrangement of the elements in the model is shown in Figure 3-7 (Section 
3.5.3.2). 
 
The model proposed by the author accounts for the fact that not all elements affect overall 
safety performance to the same degree.  As such, Attwood (2006) gathered expert opinion 
in quantitative manner (survey questionnaire), from 45 offshore safety professionals 
(Appendix II).  The experts were asked to rate relative importance of elements using a 
one (not very important at all) to then (crucial) scale. This information was used in two 
topics: 
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 The relative importance of factors influencing the accident process, and 
 The degrees to which external factors affect corporate decisions, and to which the 
corporate decisions in turn affect the direct accident causation process. 
 
The expert opinion approach was preferred over statistical data, as Attwood (2006) 
mentioned: “accident statistics may not as is usually assumed, be the best measure of 
corporate safety performance; this is essentially because, accidents remain relatively 
rare”.  As such, concluding that an organization that had one accident in a given year, 
compared with another organization that had two accidents in the same year; has a safety 
program that is twice as effective, will be questionable. 
 
4.1.5 The Reliability Calculation 
The system reliability is calculated as a function of the direct layer components’ 
reliabilities.  Therefore, if the direct element reliabilities are known, the overall system 
reliability can be calculated directly.  The overall reliability can also be calculated using 
external or corporate component reliabilities.  The equation of calculating system 
reliability is as follows: 
 
sppe
ppe
ssd
sd
sw
w
sc
c
sb
bsys RRRRRR )()()()()(   
Where: 
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bR  Reliability of behaviour    sb  strength of behaviour 
cR Reliability of capability    sc = strength of capability 
Rw = Reliability of weather    sw = strength of weather 
Rsd= Reliability of safety design   sd = strength of safety design 
Rppe = Reliability of personal protect. Equip . sppe= strength of personal protect. 
Equip. 
 
Rw (reliability value for weather conditions) is a direct input (i.e. it is an independent 
variable not base on the values of other elements).  Reliabilities of the other elements are 
calculated as follows: 
 
Reliability of Behavior: 
))1()1(1( smm
sa
ab RRR   
where: 
sa = Strength of attitude 
Ra= Reliability of attitude 
Rm = Reliability of motivation 
sm = Strength of motivation 
 
Composed of: 
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aR Reliability of attitude 
scascpraprtata IRIRIRR 
 
Rm= Reliability of motivation 
scmscprmprtmtm IRIRIRR   
Where: 
R(t, pr, sc) = Reliability of (training, safety procedures, safety culture) 
I(ta, pra, sca, tm, prm, scm) = Influence coefficient of safety (training, procedures, culture) on 
attitude/motivation. 
Reliability of Safety Training: 
vltvlrrtrrsptsppotpot IRIRIRIRR   
 
Reliability of Safety Procedures: 
vlprvlrrprrrspprsppoprpopr IRIRIRIRR   
 
Reliability of Safety Culture: 
vlscvlrrscrrspscspposcposc IRIRIRIRR   
where: 
R(po, sp, rr, vl,)= Reliability of (price of oi, shareholder pressure, royalty regime, value of 
life); all of them direct input. 
I(pot, spt, rrt, vlt)= Influence coefficient of (price of oil on, shareholder pressure, royalty 
regime, value of life) in safety training. 
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I(popr, sppr, rrpr, vlpr)= Influence coefficient of (price of oil on, shareholder pressure, royalty 
regime, value of life)in safety procedures. 
I(posc, spsc, rrsc, vlsc)= Influence coefficient of (price of oil on, shareholder pressure, royalty 
regime, value of life) in safety culture 
 
Reliability of Capability: 
sme
me
sp
pc RRR )()(   
Composed of: 
 
Reliability of physical capability: 
))1()1()1(1( scc
slf
lf
sf
p RRRfR   
Composed of: 
Reliability of Fitness: 
scfscprfprtftf IRIRIRR   
 
Reliability of lack of fatigue: 
sclfscprlfprtlftlf IRIRIRR   
 
Reliability of coordination: 
Rc= direct input 
Where: 
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I(tf, prf, scf, tlf, prlf, sclf, )= Influence coefficient of safety (training, procedures, culture) in 
fitness(f)/lack of fatigue(lf). 
sp= Strength of physical capability 
sme= strength of mental capability 
sf= strength of fitness 
slf= strength of lack of fatigue 
sc= strength of coordination 
 
Reliability of mental capability: 
))1()1(1( sii
sk
kme RRR   
Composed of: 
Reliability of knowledge: 
sckscprkprtktk IRIRIRR   
and  
Intelligence: 
Ri= direct input 
Where: 
I(tk, prk, sck)= Influence coefficient of (safety training, safety procedures and safety culture) 
on knowledge. 
sk= Strength of knowledge 
si= Strength of intelligence 
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Reliability of safety design: 
scsdscprsdprtsdtsd IRIRIRR   
 
where: 
I(tsd, prsd, scsd)= Influence coefficient of (safety training, safety procedures and safety 
culture) on safety design 
Reliability of PPE: 
scppescprppeprtppetppe IRIRIRR   
where: 
I(tppe, prppe, scppe)= Influence coefficient of (safety training, safety procedures and safety 
culture) on PPE 
 
The complete model can be visualized in Figure 4-4 presented below  
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Figure 4-4 Visualization of the Model (Reliability Values Encircled in Red Correspond to Direct Input Values) 
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sclfscprlfprtlftlf IRIRIRR 
sckscprkprtktk IRIRIRR 
vltvlrrtrrsptsppotpot IRIRIRIRR 
vlprvlrrprrrspprsppoprpopr IRIRIRIRR 
vlscvlrrscrrspscspposcposc IRIRIRIRR 
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Summarizing, each main element’s reliability is the sum of the products of the reliability 
and the associated influencing coefficient of those sub elements considered to have an 
influence on the main element. 
 
4.1.5.1 Strength values (Strength of individual elements) 
The strength values are obtained from the data gathered using questioners from 
worldwide offshore safety professionals (Total of 45 experts were consulted by Attwood).  
These questioners were used to quantify the effect (strength) of various factors thought to 
affect accident frequency.  These values are based on the fact that the model accounts that 
not all elements of the model affect overall safety performance in the same degree.   
 
The strength values are associated to the importance of all subgroups and individual 
elements within the model’s “direct layer” only.   
 
Table 4-1 Strength Values of Elements of the Direct Layer (Attwood 2006) 
Element Strength Value Element 
Strength 
Value 
Main Elements  Capability  
Behavioral 0.25 Mental 0.64 
Capability 0.21 Physical 0.36 
Weather 0.15 Mental Capability  
Safety Design 0.21 Knowledge 0.54 
PPE 0.18 Intelligence 0.46 
Behavioral  Physical Capability  
Attitude 0.49 Coordination 0.33 
Motivation 0.51 Fitness 0.29 
    Lack of fatigue 0.38 
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The expert opinions were ranked using a common scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is not very 
important and 10 will mean crucial.  It was necessary to normalize the average value of 
the gathered data, to represent clearly the relative importance of each element within its 
corresponding group or layer (refer to Table 4-1 and Appendix II).  Therefore, as a result 
the sum of the entire relative element’s importance of a specific group (layer) should be 
one.  In the system reliability equation, the strength values are included in the model as 
the exponents (see Figure 4-4).   
 
4.1.5.2 Influence Coefficients 
The model philosophy proposes that external elements affect corporate decisions and 
actions and this in turn influence items which directly affect the accident process 
(Attwood, 2006).  The inter-layer of influence has been accounted for in the calculations, 
using an approach of “matrices of influence coefficients”.  These matrices have been 
developed using expert survey questioner.  As an example: Table 4-2 shows the influence 
of the elements of the external layer (value placed on life, price of oil, share holder 
pressure and royalty regime) over training procedures and safety culture. 
 
Table 4-2 Influence Coefficients (Adopted from Attwood 2006) 
External – Corporate Influencing Coefficients 
 Normalized Scores 
Training Procedures Safety Culture 
Value placed on life 0.43 0.43 0.44 
Price of oil 0.18 0.19 0.18 
Share holder pressure 0.27 0.26 0.25 
Royalty regime 0.12 0.12 0.12 
66 
 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the influence coefficients represent the degree of influence of the 
higher layers, for example in Table 4-2 among the four elements of the higher level.  The 
element of value placed on life has the higher influence on training (about 43%).  On the 
contrary royalty regime has the lower influence (about 12%).  However, three of the 
direct elements: intelligence, coordination, and weather are considered to be independent 
variables (they do not respond to the influence of other layers) and require direct input 
(see seven independent elements in Figure 4-4, Section 4.1.5). 
 
4.1.5.3 Calculation of Model Outcome-Expected Number of Accidents 
The Attwood (2006) modeling approach considered constant failure rate model for the 
reliability calculation.  The data that Attwood (2006) used for the offshore industry 
accident rate calculation was assumed to have reached a relatively constant state.  Figure 
4-5, shows one of the safety performance indicators; FAR – Fatal accident rate with 
respect to time.  The dashed red lines show the portions he considered constant failure 
rates. 
 
Figure 4-5 Oil and Gas Fatal Accident Rate versus Time (Attwood 2006) 
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Once system reliability was calculated, the expected number of accidents for a unit time 
(usually taken as one year) was calculated by Attwood (2006) according to the reliability 
formula shown below: 
0,exp)(
0


  tedttR tt 
 
Where: 
R= system reliability at time t 
λ= average failure (accident) rate 
Therefore, taking natural logarithms of both sides and setting t=1 the failure rate is 
calculated as follows: 
 
)(RLn  
 
It is important to mention that usually the failure rates are obtained after a calibration 
process where equal base case reliabilities are assigned to all components.  Attwood 
(2006) mentioned that the establishment of different component reliabilities at calibration 
would be an unnecessary complication to the process.  The previous statement was 
supported by the author indicating that the model requires a comparison of specific case 
to a base case, not absolute reliability values.  In other words, "absolute individual 
component reliabilities are not as important as the percentage of changes in them".  
However, this statement will be reviewed and modified for the probabilistic approach of 
the Reliability Model.  The Modification will be presented later herein.  
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Figure 4-6 Visualization of the Model Inputs and Outputs – Schematic Visualized From the 
Method Proposed by Attwood (2006) 
 
4.1.6 Model Calibration 
To predict accident frequency, the model requires to be run in two distinct modes.  First, a 
calibration run is executed, where known accident rates are used to determine base case 
component reliabilities.  Second, the model is run in predictive mode following 
adjustment of the base component reliabilities in order to apply to a specific case.  The 
adjustment requires expert input familiarized with both situations.  In many applications 
the global average safety situation, with documented results is used as the base case. 
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4.2 The Proposed Probabilistic Occupational Accident Risk Model  
Specific data such as POB (number of person on board) of a specific platform, and model 
components' reliability adjustment that is given by an expert panel for a particular 
platform are fundamental to run a particular case study.  Three case studies were 
presented earlier by Attwood (2006): the Nova Scotia case study, the Newfoundland 
production installation, and the Gulf of Mexico drilling sector.  All three cases were 
considered for this research.  New additional Newfoundland occupational accident data 
were retrieved from public domain.  Therefore, the Newfoundland case has been selected 
for the implementation of the probabilistic approach. 
 
Table 4-3 Component Ratings for Newfoundland Installation (Attwood 2006) 
Factor Expert Score Factor Expert Score 
External factors  Direct factors  Attitude 6 
Value placed on life 9 Motivation 7 
Price of oil 10 Lack of fatigue 8 
Shareholder pressure 3 Coordination 5 
Royalty regime 4 Fitness 6 
Corporate factors  Knowledge 8 
Safety culture 8 Intelligence 5 
Safety training 7 Safety design 7 
Safety procedures 9 Weather 1 
  Personal protective 
equipment  
9 
 
Table 4-3 shows the scores assigned to model components by the expert panel for the 
Newfoundland Installation (Attwood 2006).  This information is crucial for adjusting 
component reliabilities, from the base case to the location specific case, as explained in 
Section 4.1.5.1.  The proposed modifications to the Reliability Model is graphically 
presented in Figure 4-7. 
70 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-7 Summarized Visualization of the Probabilistic Approach of the Reliability Model Proposed by this Research 
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The modifications of the model involve more details than the ones presented in Figure 
4-7.  Therefore, a step by step model modification overview has been developed and it is 
schematically presented below.  The model overview is divided in five tasks.  Each task is 
then further developed and explained in detail in the following sections. 
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Task 1: Transforming expert opinion (strength values and influence coefficients) into a probabilistic input (normal distributions) 
for the calibration of the reliability model.  This is an additional step to the Attwood model in terms of considering probabilistic 
distribution of parameters. 
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Element Strength Value Element 
Strength 
Value 
Main Elements  Capability 
Behavioral 0.25 Mental 0.64
Capability 0.21 Physical 0.36 
Weather 0.15 Mental Capability 
Safety Design  0.21 Knowledge 0.54
PPE 0.18 Intelligence 0.46 
Behavioral  Physical Capability  
Attitud 0.49 Coordination 0.33
Motivation 0.51 Fitness 0.29 
  Lack of fatigue 0.38 
 
The diagrams below show the steps for the 
transformation of normalized expert opinion (in this 
case strength values) into normal distributions to feed 
into the proposed reliability model for calibration. 
R
eliability 
M
odel 
N(μm, σm) 
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Task 2: Gathering TRIR data (from 2000 to 2011) and transforming these data into falure rate data and then reliability data for 
model calibration.  This step is also another modification to the Attwood model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TRIR is obtained from “Appendix B” of OGP reports (years 2000 to 2012).  
OGP reports give data by regions (seven regions) and by company type 
(offshore and onshore) for all safety indicators.  The offshore regional data was 
used to calculate the respective TRIR for offshore operations (company and 
contractors included).  Results are presented in the following figure. 
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Task 2 (Cont'): 
The Process of obtaining the reliability values required for calibration of the proposed model is shown in the table below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Global  
OGP 
Data 
Person-hours 
worked NL 
platform 
Expected No 
of 
Recordable 
Cases for NL
Failure 
probab. of a 
worker/year 
Cum ulativ
e Failu re 
(F) 
Reliability 
(1-F) 
2000 7.64 438300 3.349 0.033 0.033 0.967 
2001 5.90 438300 2.587 0.026 0.059 0.941 
2002 4.78 438300 2.094 0.021 0.080 0.920 
2003 4.15 438300 1.819 0.018 0.098 0.902 
2004 5.87 438300 2.574 0.026 0.124 0.876 
2005 3.93 438300 1.721 0.017 0.141 0.859 
2006 3.73 438300 1.636 0.016 0.157 0.843 
2007 3.26 438300 1.428 0.014 0.172 0.828 
2008 3.09 438300 1.354 0.014 0.185 0.815 
2009 2.70 438300 1.183 0.012 0.197 0.803 
2010 2.35 438300 1.030 0.010 0.207 0.793 
2011 2.83 438300 1.240 0.012 0.220 0.780 
 
TRIR per 10^6 hours 
worked (from global 
data). These calculation 
are done for all 7 
regions  
Assumptions: 
100 people working in NL platform  
50 people working in a given time (2 
turns of 12 hrs each) 
50*24*325.25 = 438,300 
=438300*(OGP 
data/10^6)  
= (Expected No of 
Recordable cases for NL 
for the particular year) 
/100 (No of workers in a 
platform) 
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Task 3: Model Calibration is performed using reliability values found for the 7 regions (OGP data), to find the 7 unkowns.  This 
is completely a new step and an extension to the Attwood model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seven Regions are: 
 
Africa 
Asia/Australia 
Europe 
FSU 
Middle East, 
North America and 
South America 
Each of the seven based reliability 
values(R) are expressed as a two 
parameter Weibull distribution. 
As a result the following 
results are obtained (“R” 
stands for reliability): 
 
RHuman Life 
Rprice of oil 
RShare holder pressure 
Rroyalty regime 
Rweather 
Rintelligence 
Rcoordination 
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Task 4: The estimated reliability values of the elements of the model are transformed for the Newfoundland platform case.  All 
data is entered in the proposed reliability model and a Monte Carlo simultation is run using @RISK and the expert’s score given 
for the platform.  This is another major modification to the Attwoods (2006) approach.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model is run using a new component reliability 
adjustment, different to Attwood’s approach (2006, 
pp194 to pp195).  The table below shows the 
transformation factor been used. 
((10-Expert 
Score)/5) 
(R^Exponent)
R of Newfoundland 
platform 
Monte-Carlo Simulation Factor NFLD Factor ExponentValue placed on life 9 Value placed on life 0.2
Price of oil 10 Price of oil 0
Shareholder pressure 3 Shareholder pressure 1.4
Royalty regime 4 Royalty regime 1.2
Safety culture 8 Safety culture 0.40
Safety training 7 Safety training 0.60
Safety procedures 9 Safety procedures 0.20
Attitude 6 Attitude 0.8
Motivation 7 Motivation 0.6
Lack of fatigue 8 Lack of fatigue 0.4
Coordination 5 Coordination 1
Fitness 6 Fitness 0.8
Knowledge 8 Knowledge 0.4
Intelligence 5 Intelligence 1
Safety design 7 Safety design 0.6
Weather 1 Weather 1.8
PPE 9 PPE 0.2
Experts’ 
assigned scores 
for 
Newfoundland 
Platform 
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Task 5: Risk calculation for the case study.  Usually calculated and presented in terms of Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA).  
This is another major extension to the Attwood work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8)20112000( 10
/__ yearpersonhourWorkingFARIRPA  
Probability of Incident Rate   X   Consequences =RISK 
Framework for tolerability of Risk 
ALARP Monte Carlo Simulation for IRPA estimation 
Occupational Risk Assessment for 
Offshore O&G operations
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5 RESULTS AND DISCUSIONS 
5.1 Task 1: Transforming Expert Opinion to a Probabilistic Input  
Attwood (2006) gathered expert opinion in a quantitative manner (survey questionnaire), 
from 45 offshore safety professionals (Appendix II).  The experts were asked to rate 
relative importance of the model elements using a 1 (not very important at all) to 10 
(crucial) scale.  This information was used in two topics: 
 
 The relative importance of factors influencing the accident process (Table 4-1); 
and 
 The degrees to which external factors affect corporate decisions, and to which the 
corporate decisions in turn affect the direct accident process (Table 4-2). 
 
As described in Section 4.1.5, these data were used for the calculation of the “Strength 
Values” and “Influence Coefficients”, respectively, in the reliability model.  Attwood 
(2006) used the normalized average values (deterministic approach) for the expert’s 
opinion as a model input.  Attwood’s proposed model was developed in an Excel 
spreadsheet with a predetermined number of input parameters and a few equations that 
use those input values to give a set of outputs (or response variables).  This type of model 
is qualified as deterministic, given that the results are always the same no matter how 
many times it is re-calculated. 
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To transform the determinist model to a probabilistic one, the average values of the expert 
opinion have to be replaced by a "function" that describe the experts’ responses.  To 
achieve this objective; the normalized strength values and influence coefficients are 
transformed to normal distributions as input values for the reliability calculations.  The 
selection of a normal distribution as the function that describes expert opinion is due to a 
main property of this distribution that fit the characteristics of the gathered data.  Most of 
the expert opinion is near the middle datum or average of the sample.  Figure 5-1 
schematically shows the difference between the deterministic and the probabilistic 
approaches for this case.  Tables Table 5-1 and Table 5-2 show the results of the 
probabilistic inputs. 
 
Figure 5-1 Graphical Representation of the Differences Between Deterministic and 
Probabilistic Input for the Reliability Model 
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Table 5-1 Normal Distribution Parameters for the Influence Coefficient 
Influence Coefficients Average Standard Deviation 
Training 
Value place on life 0.43 0.08 
Price of oil 0.18 0.07 
Shareholder 
pressure 
0.27 0.06 
Royalty regime 0.12 0.05 
Procedures 
Value place on life 0.43 0.10 
Price of oil 0.19 0.07 
Shareholder 
pressure 0.26 0.07 
Royalty regime 0.12 0.07 
Safety culture 
Value place on life 0.44 0.11 
Price of oil 0.18 0.06 
Shareholder 
pressure 0.25 0.08 
Royalty regime 0.13 0.06 
Attitude 
Training 0.33 0.04 
Procedures 0.30 0.04 
Safety culture 0.37 0.05 
Motivation 
Training 0.33 0.05 
Procedures 0.30 0.05 
Safety culture 0.37 0.06 
Fitness 
Training 0.34 0.06 
Procedures 0.30 0.04 
Safety culture 0.36 0.07 
Lack of fatigue 
Training 0.31 0.07 
procedures 0.32 0.06 
safety culture 0.37 0.08 
Knowledge 
Training 0.36 0.04 
Procedures 0.30 0.05 
Safety culture 0.34 0.04 
Safety design 
Training 0.31 0.05 
Procedures 0.32 0.06 
Safety culture 0.37 0.08 
PPE 
Training 0.32 0.07 
Procedures 0.33 0.04 
Safety culture 0.35 0.05 
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Table 5-2 Normal Distributions Parameters for the Strength Values 
Strength Values Average Standard Deviation 
Overall layer 
External 0.22 0.09 
Corporate 0.42 0.08 
Direct 0.35 0.09 
External 
Elements 
Financial 0.43 0.15 
Value Placed on Life 0.57 0.15 
Financial 
Elements 
Price of Oil 0.30 0.12 
Shareholder pressure 0.44 0.14 
Royalty regime 0.26 0.11 
Corporate 
layer 
Safety Culture 0.35 0.05 
Training 0.33 0.03 
Safety Procedures 0.32 0.05 
Direct layer 
Behavioural 0.25 0.04 
Capability 0.21 0.03 
Weather 0.15 0.04 
Safety design 0.21 0.04 
PPE 0.18 0.05 
Behavioural 
elements 
Attitude 0.49 0.14 
Motivation 0.51 0.14 
Capability 
elements 
Physical 0.35 0.13 
Mental 0.65 0.13 
Physical 
Capability 
Lack of fatigue 0.38 0.05 
Coordination 0.33 0.04 
Fitness 0.29 0.05 
Mental 
Capability 
Knowledge 0.54 0.08 
Intelligence 0.46 0.08 
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5.2 Task 2: Gathering Global Data to Define Failure Rate for Model Calibration 
5.2.1 The international Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) Data 
The International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP), represents the upstream 
oil & gas industry, including the International Maritime Organization, the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP), Regional Seas Conventions and other groups under the 
UN umbrella (OGP 2013).  OGP encompasses most of the world’s leading publicly-
traded, private and state-owned oil & gas companies, oil & gas associations and major 
upstream service companies.  OGP members produce more than half the world’s oil and 
about one third of its gas(OGP 2013).  An essential part of OGP’s mission is to represent 
the interests of the upstream industry before international regulators and legislators.  
 
As one of its many functions OGP has been collecting safety incident data from member 
companies globally since 1985.  The data collected are entered into the OGP safety 
database, which is the largest database of safety performance in the Exploration and 
Production (E&P) industry.   
 
The principal purpose of the data collection and analysis is to record the global safety 
performance of the contributing OGP member companies, each year.  The annual reports 
provide trend analysis, benchmarking and the identification of areas and activities on 
which efforts should be focused to bring about the greatest improvements in performance.  
The OGP incident reporting system covers worldwide exploration and production 
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operations; both onshore and offshore, and includes incidents involving both; member 
companies and their contractor employees.   
 
The key safety performance indicators presented in OGP annual reports are: number of 
fatalities, fatal accident rate, lost time injury frequency, restricted work day cases, loss 
time injury frequency and total recordable injury rate. 
 
In this research, the safety performance indicator used for the proposed reliability model 
that better describes safety of offshore platforms is the Total Recordable Injury Rate 
(TRIR).  The TRIR describes the number of recordable injuries (fatalities + lost work day 
cases + restricted work day cases + medical treatment cases) per 1,000,000 hours worked.  
This safety indicator was selected based on the project scope; because the TRIR better 
encompasses the occupational accidents that Attwood (2006) was aiming to describe: 
“occupational accidents of high frequency and low severity”.   
 
Twelve OGP Safety Performance reports (from 2000 to 2012) were reviewed to extract 
the data corresponding to the TRIR indicator for offshore activities (company and 
contractor included).  The offshore data was gathered by year and by region in tables 
presented in the Appendix I of this thesis.  These data were used to calculate the offshore 
TRIR for each year and for each region.  Next, the TRIR calculated values were used as 
input values for the proposed reliability model in order to perform model calibration as 
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described in Task 3 of the Methodology section.  Figure 5-2 shows the summary of TRIR 
from 2000 to 2011. 
 
Figure 5-2 Total Recordable Injury Rate years 2002 to 2011 (Taken from OGP Data) 
 
5.2.2 Modification of Model Calibration 
The original methodology proposed by Attwood (2006) for the model calibration has 
been modified in this research.  The bases for the modifications and the details are 
described below. 
 
In the calibration proposed by Attwood (2006) the input values to the model are those 
components which are independent of others (higher level).  This highest level elements 
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are the four elements of the external layer (value of human life, price of oil, shareholder 
pressure and royalty regime), plus those elements of direct input (weather, intelligence 
and coordination).  Attwood (2006) stated that there was no basis for setting these seven 
elements as input values different from each other, given the global average nature of the 
calibration run.  However, during the course of this research it was found that if we 
assume that all this seven elements are the same (model with one variable instead of 
seven), the model does not calibrate.  As an exercise, different values were replaced in the 
equation presented in Figure 4-4 (Section 4.1.5) it was evident that the model did not 
calibrate under those initial conditions.  To demonstrate this through a simple example, 
let's assume that the reliability input values of the seven independent variables (Rpo, Rsp, 
Rrr, Rvl, Rw, Rcoo, and  Ri) presented in the model are 1 (refer to Figure 4-4 reliability 
values circled in red).  As a result, the next layers of the model influenced by the 
corporate layers (Rt, Rpr, Rsc) will also be 1 given that the Influence Coefficients that are 
factoring each one of them are normalized and therefore add up to 1.  Following the 
calculations, it is possible to see that also the elements of the direct layer such as Rb will 
also be 1 (note that the exponents are also normalized and they add to 1 in every layer).  
Therefore, as a result the overall RSYSTEM is 1.  Similarly, if the calculations are performed 
using other reliability value instead of 1 for the seven independent reliabilities input in the 
model, the overall result will be exactly the same as the input value.  The reason why 
Attwood (2006) found calibration results apparently successful was because the model 
with one unknown or variable was solved using Goal seek function in Microsoft Excel 
environment and the output results were slight different than the input values.  The input 
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values were in the order of 10-5 or less.  As such, Excel was rounding up the output results 
and therefore, there was a false impression of a proper calibration whereas the actual 
difference was due to arithmetic roundup of the calculated values. 
 
As such, it was necessary to change the original framework of Attwood's model and 
assume that the seven elements have different input values.  Therefore, in order to solve 
the seven unknowns for the calibration process it was necessary to find seven equations.  
Fortunately, the OGP data is also presented as segregated data for seven different regions 
of Africa, Asia/Australia, Europe, Former Soviet Union (FSU), Middle East, North 
America and South America.  Therefore, these regional data were used to solve the 
calibration portion in MATLAB.  The regional data used are summarized in Appendix I. 
The overall results are presented below in Table 5-3 and Figure 5-3 
 
Table 5-3 TRIR Summarized Offshore OGP Database (Global and Regional Data, Years 2000 
to 2011) 
Year Global Africa Asia/ Australia Europe FSU 
Middle 
East 
North 
America 
South 
America 
2000 7.64 3.90 4.03 14.75 0.86 4.37 6.31 5.47 
2001 5.90 3.84 3.81 11.51 4.26 3.42 5.03 3.71 
2002 4.78 5.78 3.18 9.74 1.56 1.95 3.85 4.28 
2003 4.15 5.14 2.46 9.73 2.52 1.95 2.60 4.31 
2004 5.87 8.68 2.88 8.35 2.78 3.36 5.23 11.34 
2005 3.93 3.30 2.78 6.38 2.56 3.64 3.39 4.93 
2006 3.73 2.39 1.73 6.75 4.40 2.73 4.19 4.59 
2007 3.26 2.62 2.04 6.14 3.50 2.76 3.01 2.60 
2008 3.09 2.41 1.92 5.87 2.41 2.83 3.12 3.22 
2009 2.70 1.94 1.93 5.24 1.16 1.67 3.21 2.64 
2010 2.35 1.87 1.56 4.48 1.80 1.56 2.60 3.01 
2011 2.83 2.88 1.50 4.30 1.67 1.27 2.19 3.94 
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Figure 5-3 TRIR – Summarized Offshore OGP Database (Global versus Regional From 2000 to 
2011) 
The TRIR offshore regional data presented in Table 5-3 had to be transformed to 
reliability values, as explained in Task 2 (Methodology Section) in order to proceed with 
the calibration of the proposed reliability model.  Those values are presented in Table 5-4. 
 
Based on the conditions preset by Attwood (2006), it was assumed that the platform 
under study (Newfoundland offshore platform) has 100 workers and 50% of them are 
working continuously year around.  Therefore, to calculate the TRIR for this particular 
platform using the global data the following transformation was done: 
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Table 5-4 TRIR Transformed Data for 100 Workers in an Offshore Platform 
Year Global Africa Asia/ Australia Europe FSU 
Middle 
East 
North 
America 
South 
America 
2000 3.35 1.71 1.77 6.47 0.38 1.92 2.77 2.40 
2001 2.59 1.68 1.67 5.04 1.87 1.50 2.21 1.63 
2002 2.09 2.53 1.39 4.27 0.68 0.85 1.69 1.88 
2003 1.82 2.25 1.08 4.27 1.11 0.86 1.14 1.89 
2004 2.57 3.81 1.26 3.66 1.22 1.47 2.29 4.97 
2005 1.72 1.44 1.22 2.80 1.12 1.60 1.49 2.16 
2006 1.64 1.05 0.76 2.96 1.93 1.20 1.84 2.01 
2007 1.43 1.15 0.89 2.69 1.54 1.21 1.32 1.14 
2008 1.35 1.06 0.84 2.57 1.06 1.24 1.37 1.41 
2009 1.18 0.85 0.85 2.30 0.51 0.73 1.41 1.16 
2010 1.03 0.82 0.68 1.96 0.79 0.68 1.14 1.32 
2011 1.24 1.26 0.66 1.89 0.73 0.56 0.96 1.73 
 
The data in Table 5-4 had to be transformed into failure probability data, defined as the 
probability of an accident occurring to a worker of the NL offshore platform in one year 
of operation.  Therefore, each TRIR presented in Table 5-4 had to be divided by 100 
(platform population).  The failure probability data is presented in Table 5-5. 
Table 5-5 Calculated Worker Failure Probability Using TRIR (From Table 5-4) 
Year Global Africa Asia/ Australia Europe FSU 
Middle 
East 
North 
America 
South 
America 
2000 0.0335 0.0171 0.0177 0.0647 0.0038 0.0192 0.0277 0.0240 
2001 0.0259 0.0168 0.0167 0.0504 0.0187 0.0150 0.0221 0.0163 
2002 0.0209 0.0253 0.0139 0.0427 0.0068 0.0085 0.0169 0.0188 
2003 0.0182 0.0225 0.0108 0.0427 0.0111 0.0086 0.0114 0.0189 
2004 0.0257 0.0381 0.0126 0.0366 0.0122 0.0147 0.0229 0.0497 
2005 0.0172 0.0144 0.0122 0.0280 0.0112 0.0160 0.0149 0.0216 
2006 0.0164 0.0105 0.0076 0.0296 0.0193 0.0120 0.0184 0.0201 
2007 0.0143 0.0115 0.0089 0.0269 0.0154 0.0121 0.0132 0.0114 
2008 0.0135 0.0106 0.0084 0.0257 0.0106 0.0124 0.0137 0.0141 
2009 0.0118 0.0085 0.0085 0.0230 0.0051 0.0073 0.0141 0.0116 
2010 0.0103 0.0082 0.0068 0.0196 0.0079 0.0068 0.0114 0.0132 
2011 0.0124 0.0126 0.0066 0.0189 0.0073 0.0056 0.0096 0.0173 
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The failure probability calculated for each year was transformed into cumulative failure, 
in order to calculate the reliability data.  Reliability is defined as one minus the 
cumulative failure for the particular year under study.  The cumulative failure calculation 
is presented in Table 5-6 and the calculated reliability values are presented in Table 5-7.  
Illustrations of the results are also presented in Figure 5-4 and Figure 5-5 respectively. 
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Table 5-6 Cumulative Worker Failure Probability Using TRIR (From Table 5-5) 
Year Global Africa Asia/ Australia Europe FSU 
Middle 
East 
North 
America 
South 
America 
2000 0.0335 0.0171 0.0177 0.0647 0.0038 0.0192 0.0277 0.0240 
2001 0.0594 0.0339 0.0344 0.1151 0.0224 0.0341 0.0497 0.0403 
2002 0.0803 0.0592 0.0483 0.1578 0.0293 0.0427 0.0666 0.0590 
2003 0.0985 0.0818 0.0591 0.2005 0.0403 0.0512 0.0780 0.0779 
2004 0.1242 0.1198 0.0717 0.2370 0.0525 0.0660 0.1009 0.1277 
2005 0.1414 0.1342 0.0838 0.2650 0.0637 0.0819 0.1158 0.1492 
2006 0.1578 0.1447 0.0914 0.2946 0.0830 0.0939 0.1342 0.1693 
2007 0.1721 0.1562 0.1003 0.3215 0.0984 0.1060 0.1473 0.1808 
2008 0.1856 0.1668 0.1088 0.3472 0.1089 0.1184 0.1610 0.1949 
2009 0.1975 0.1753 0.1172 0.3702 0.1140 0.1257 0.1750 0.2065 
2010 0.2078 0.1835 0.1241 0.3899 0.1219 0.1326 0.1865 0.2197 
2011 0.2181 0.1916 0.1309 0.4095 0.1298 0.1394 0.1979 0.2328 
 
 
Figure 5-4 Cumulative Failure Plot by Region Based on the TRIR Data 
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Table 5-7 Reliability Based on Estimated Failure Probability Data. 
Year Global Africa Asia/ Australia Europe FSU 
Middle 
East 
North 
America 
South 
America 
2000 0.9665 0.9829 0.9823 0.9353 0.9962 0.9808 0.9723 0.9760 
2001 0.9406 0.9661 0.9656 0.8849 0.9776 0.9659 0.9503 0.9597 
2002 0.9197 0.9408 0.9517 0.8422 0.9707 0.9573 0.9334 0.9410 
2003 0.9015 0.9182 0.9409 0.7995 0.9597 0.9488 0.9220 0.9221 
2004 0.8758 0.8802 0.9283 0.7630 0.9475 0.9340 0.8991 0.8723 
2005 0.8586 0.8658 0.9162 0.7350 0.9363 0.9181 0.8842 0.8508 
2006 0.8422 0.8553 0.9086 0.7054 0.9170 0.9061 0.8658 0.8307 
2007 0.8279 0.8438 0.8997 0.6785 0.9016 0.8940 0.8527 0.8192 
2008 0.8144 0.8332 0.8912 0.6528 0.8911 0.8816 0.8390 0.8051 
2009 0.8025 0.8247 0.8828 0.6298 0.8860 0.8743 0.8250 0.7935 
2010 0.7922 0.8165 0.8759 0.6101 0.8781 0.8674 0.8135 0.7803 
2011 0.7819 0.8084 0.8691 0.5905 0.8702 0.8606 0.8021 0.7672 
 
 
 
Figure 5-5 Reliability Plot by Region Based on the TRIR Data 
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5.3 Task 3: Model Calibration 
5.3.1 MATLAB Results for the Seven Unknown Reliabilities Used as Direct Input 
for the Model 
A MATLAB code was developed to solve the seven unknowns entered into the model as 
input reliability values.  This code has been included in its entirety in Appendix III.  As 
described in Section 4.2, a system of seven equations and seven unknowns were prepared.  
The results produced by the MATLAB code are presented in Table 5-8.  Once the seven 
unknowns are estimated it is possible to obtain the reliability of the system under average 
conditions.   
Table 5-8 MATLAB Results by Year for Seven Unknown Reliabilities  
Year Rw Rcoo Ri Rpo Rsp Rrr Rvl 
2000 0.9755 0.9780 0.9785 0.9760 0.9745 0.9735 0.9745 
2001 0.9535 0.9575 0.9560 0.9530 0.9540 0.9525 0.9510 
2002 0.9340 0.9380 0.9370 0.9355 0.9350 0.9340 0.9315 
2003 0.9155 0.9200 0.9190 0.9170 0.9165 0.9170 0.9140 
2004 0.8890 0.8935 0.8945 0.8905 0.8895 0.8900 0.8870 
2005 0.8725 0.8770 0.8780 0.8730 0.8725 0.8740 0.8700 
2006 0.8555 0.8620 0.8610 0.8565 0.8555 0.8580 0.8530 
2007 0.8410 0.8485 0.8470 0.8425 0.8420 0.8450 0.8380 
2008 0.8275 0.8360 0.8355 0.8300 0.8275 0.8325 0.8235 
2009 0.8170 0.8255 0.8260 0.8190 0.8160 0.8210 0.8120 
2010 0.8070 0.8175 0.8175 0.8080 0.8050 0.8100 0.8010 
2011 0.7965 0.8070 0.8070 0.7970 0.7940 0.8010 0.7905 
 
Where: 
Rw: is reliability of weather; Rcco: is reliability of coordination; Ri: is reliability of 
intelligence; Rpo: is reliability of price of oil; Rsp: is reliability of shareholder pressure 
Rrr: is reliability of royalty regime; Rvl: is reliability of value of life. 
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Given that the Weibull distribution is widely used in reliability and life data analyses due 
to its versatility, another MATLAB code was also developed to fit a two parameter 
Weibull distribution function to each one of the seven reliability outputs (also known as 
elements of direct input) presented in Table 5-8.  This code is presented in Appendix IV 
of this document.   
 
The Weibull distribution was chosen to fit the data, given that this distribution has hazard 
rate functions that is not constant over time; thus, providing a necessary alternative to the 
exponential failure law.  The Weibull parameters found for each one of those seven 
elements are presented in Table 5-9. 
 
Table 5-9 Weibull Parameters for the Seven Reliability Elements of Direct Input 
Weibull 
parameters Rw Rcoo Ri Rpo Rsp Rrr Rvl 
θ 66.14 69.19 70.08 65.57 63.7 70.06 63.43 
β 0.846 0.854 0.848 0.854 0.860 0.863 0.850 
 
The Weibull parameters (θ and β) can be described as follows:  
 
The Weibull “shape parameter” Beta (β) is referred also known as the Weibull slope.  
This is because the value of β is equal to the slope of the line in a probability plot.  
Weibull distributions with β < 1 have a failure rate that decreases with time, also known 
as early-life failures.  Weibull distributions with β close to or equal to 1 have a fairly 
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constant failure rate similar in shape to the exponential (Ebeling 1997), indicative of 
useful life or random failures.   
 
Theta (θ) the “scale parameter”, that influences both the mean and the spread, or 
dispersion, of the distribution indicates that 63.2% of all Weibull failures will occur by 
time t= θ regardless of the value of the shape parameter (Ebeling 1997). 
 
The shape parameter Beta (β), and the scale parameter Theta (θ), affect Weibull 
distribution characteristics.  Such as, the shape of the provability density function curve 
f(t), the reliability R(t) and the failure rate λ(t).   
 
Probability density function equation 




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5.3.2 Monte Carlo Simulation for Average Conditions of System Reliability 
The Weibull parameters for the seven elements of direct input are now known.  
Therefore, using these parameters and the equations presented above, it is possible to 
predict the number of accidents of an offshore platform for a given year under average 
conditions.   
 
Therefore, to achieve this objective the reliability values of the seven elements of direct 
input can be calculated for a particular year using the reliability equation of a Weibull 
distribution and the already calculated parameters (see Table 5-9).  These reliability 
values are substituted in the model (refer to Figure 4-6).  Then, the model is run using the 
commercially available software, @RISK, to obtain a Monte Carlo simulation for the 
system reliability under average conditions.   
 
Figure 5-7 shows the result of simulation for system's reliability for the year 2011 as 
presented by @RISK software.  The mean reliability value is 0.79 with a maximum of 
0.98 and a minimum of 0.6 (see summary statistics for the Reliability of the System in 
Figure 5-7).  Using this approach, the reliability values for the years 2000 to 2011 were 
estimated and compared to the calculated reliability using OGP data (see Table 5-7 
"Global" column).  The results that involve minimum maximum and mean values are 
presented in Table 5-10 - additionally standard deviation, 5 percentile and 95 percentile 
are also presented.  As the table below shows the estimated mean values are very close to 
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the calculated reliability values using the OGP data.  The results are illustrated in Figure 
5-6. 
Table 5-10 Estimated Reliability Values for the Years of 2000 to 2011 Using the Revised Model 
Approach 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
min 0.7876 0.6930 0.7042 0.6521 0.6848 0.5957 0.6397 0.6254 0.6540 0.6424 0.6012 0.6044 
max 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9729 0.9744 0.9814 1.0110 0.9431 0.9560 0.9962 0.9903 0.9883 
mean 0.9060 0.8856 0.8779 0.8668 0.8544 0.8393 0.8290 0.8182 0.8105 0.8022 0.7944 0.7855 
Std Dev 0.0492 0.0553 0.0557 0.0539 0.0548 0.0582 0.0575 0.0573 0.0592 0.0626 0.0596 0.0605 
5% 0.8128 0.7995 0.7840 0.7700 0.7595 0.7346 0.7363 0.7183 0.7105 0.6944 0.6955 0.6806 
95% 0.9825 0.9700 0.9596 0.9486 0.9367 0.9304 0.9147 0.8995 0.9021 0.9021 0.8870 0.8808 
OGP 0.9665 0.9406 0.9197 0.9015 0.8758 0.8586 0.8422 0.8279 0.8144 0.8025 0.7922 0.7819 
 
 
 
Figure 5-6 Estimated Reliabilities Using Model and Monte Carlo Simulations for the Years 
2000 to 2011 Versus Reliability Calculated From OGP Data 
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For an occupational safety analysis using this model, lower reliability values such as 5 
percentile, represents the maximum number of accidents.  Therefore, if necessary to keep 
a very conservative approach, occupational safety analysis for a particular year can be 
obtained using this value as worst case scenario.  Another interesting outcome of the 
simulation using @RISK is the visualization of the effect that the inputs have on the 
output mean (refer to Figure 5-7); for example, "price of oil" has a considerable effect 
compared with all the others in reducing the System Reliability.  On the contrary, the 
element: "procedures" has an effect in increasing the output mean of System Reliability. 
 
Once the system reliability has been calculated for several years (let’s say years 2000 to 
2011 as shown in Table 5-10) the reliability outputs can be fitted again in a two parameter 
Weibull distribution using the MATLAB code developed in Section 5.3.1 (Appendix IV).  
Once the parameters Theta (θ) and Beta (β) are found for the reliability of the system 
under the average conditions defined by OGP data, they can be used to predict system 
reliability or failure rate for any given year.  This prediction will not require seven input 
reliability values given that they have been already used to calculate the Weibull 
parameters for System reliability under average conditions.   
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Figure 5-7 Monte Carlo Simulation Results to Obtain System Reliability Using @RISK for the 
Year 2011  
@RISK Output Report for Reliability of the SYSTEM (Sim#5)
Performed By: PARAND
Date: April-16-13 3:42:53 PM
Workbook Name @RISK simulation for Reliabi
Number of Simulations 5
Number of Iterations
Number of Inputs 58
Number of Outputs 29
Sampling Type Latin Hypercube
Simulation Start Time
Simulation Duration
Random # Generator
Random Seed
Statistics Percentile
Minimum 0.604424314 5% 0.680626564
Maximum 0.98825078 10% 0.706457342
Mean 0.785511676 15% 0.720796374
Std Dev 0.060520275 20% 0.734614509
Variance 0.003662704 25% 0.743007628
Skewness ‐0.170169235 30% 0.753135595
Kurtosis 2.920714731 35% 0.762512302
Median 0.789210993 40% 0.773126523
Mode 0.845945202 45% 0.780271709
Left X 0.680626564 50% 0.789210993
Left P 5% 55% 0.797299338
Right X 0.880894916 60% 0.805108949
Right P 95% 65% 0.811818765
Diff X 0.200268352 70% 0.820832024
Diff P 90% 75% 0.829430834
#Errors 48 80% 0.84118815
Filter Min Off 85% 0.847375835
Filter Max Off 90% 0.85560333
#Filtered 0 95% 0.880894916
Rank Name Lower Upper
1 Price of oil / Proce0.7380409 0.804709073
2 Shareholder pres 0.7530312 0.818318979
3 Value Placed on L0.7544161 0.818041467
4 Safety culture / Sa0.7517536 0.814399942
5 Shareholder pres 0.7592547 0.821121244
6 Value Placed on L0.7485926 0.805595506
7 Price of oil / Safet0.7495088 0.806434267
8 Value Placed on L0.7566457 0.812480627
9 Safety culture / P 0.7611731 0.815840133
10 Procedures / Safe0.7619862 0.814175965
11 Royalty regime / S0.7555601 0.807687544
12 Motivation / Scor 0.7542385 0.803000612
13 Royalty regime / P0.7623144 0.809442532
14 Price of oil / Train0.7626137 0.807326213
Simulation Summary Information
Change in Output Statistic for  Reliability of the SYST
500
16/04/2013 15:38
00:00:03
Mersenne Twister
1487937672
Summary Statistics for Reliability of the SYSTEM
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5.4 Task 4: Specific Case Run  
5.4.1 Component Reliability Adjustment  
To predict accident frequency for a specific scenario as in the case of Newfoundland and 
Labrador platform, the model is run following adjustment of the base case component 
reliabilities in line with the safety environment of the installation under study.  This 
adjustment is made based on expert opinion.   
 
Attwood (2006) suggested that the degree of component reliability adjustment is based on 
the opinion of experts familiar with both base (average global) and specific case safety 
conditions.  The experts assign scores from one to ten for each factor, representing the 
component's specific case conditions, compared to global average, which is represented 
by a score of five.  Higher scores, in all cases, represent situations more favorable to 
safety results and vice versa (Attwood 2006). 
 
The transformation of expert's scores to adjust components reliabilities as proposed by 
Attwood 2006 should be modified for the following reasons: 
 
 Attwood (2006) proposes using a "power 2" function.  Therefore, making the 
changes in component reliability proportional to the square of the ratio of specific 
case to average case score (average case score equals 5).  For example, an 
assigned score of 6 would produce a component reliability increase of (6/5)2, this 
value is then multiplied by the correspondent base component reliability to obtain 
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the new component reliability corresponding to the particular case study (Atwood 
2006).  The problem of using Attwood's approach for this research is that most of 
Attwood's calculated factors for NL are higher than 1 (See Figure 5-8).  Therefore, 
the multiplication of Attwood's calculated factors by the average base component 
reliabilities estimated for this research exceed 1 for most of the elements of the 
model.  Results higher than one are erroneous because reliability values are 
probability values and should range between zero and one. 
 
 
Figure 5-8 Expert Score Transformation as per Attwood 2006 
 
 Attwood's base component reliabilities obtained for his doctoral thesis were very 
low and therefore the multiplication of the base component reliabilities by the 
calculated factors were considerably increasing the reliability of components for 
the specific case, but these values did not exceed one.  Nonetheless, it is important 
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to note that component reliabilities for average conditions and specific cases 
should always be high and very close to one (at least for the first years where the 
model starts calibrating).  In this context, small reliability values do not reflect 
average offshore safety conditions, given that offshore operation demand high 
occupational safety standards. 
 
In this research, high reliability values were found (see Table 5-7).  These values better 
represent the safety conditions of an average offshore platform, considering that there are 
few occupational accidents in relation with the number of hours worked.   
 
Therefore, expert score was transformed using a different approach, as it is presented in 
the equation below: 
 
)
5
10(
)_()( )(ReRe
eExpertScor
conditionaverageNL liabilityliability

  
 
The power function:  
5
10 eExpertScor
 
This function transforms expert opinion into a useful power index based on the following 
criterion:  
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If expert score is 10 (maximum possible score for the reliability component and higher 
than global average).  Therefore, the power function will be: 
0
5
1010 
 
Then: 10 R  (maximum reliability value) 
 
If expert score is 5 (meaning that conditions of the particular platform are same as global 
average).  Then the power function will be: 
 
1
5
510 
 
Then: RR 1  (same reliability value as average condition) 
 
If expert score is lower than 5 (meaning that the reliability of that element for the 
particular platform is lower than the global average) 
 
8.1
5
110 
 
Then: lowerRR 8.1  (lower reliability value than global average) 
 
The following table shows the calculated exponents for the Newfoundland and Labrador 
offshore platforms based on expert opinion using the approach presented above. 
103 
 
 
 
Table 5-11 Expert Score Transformation for Newfoundland and Labrador Platforms 
 
 
5.4.2 Reliability of the Specific Case versus the Reliability of the Global Average 
Conditions  
It is important to note that the experts rated the Newfoundland and Labrador offshore 
operation as of higher safety performance than the average global conditions (at least for 
12 of the 17 elements assessed on Table 5-11).  The reliability results of the overall 
system calculated with the approach presented in Section 5.4.1 are presented in Table 
5-12.  The results agree with the experts' opinion.  Overall yearly reliability of the system 
of NL offshore operations are higher than the global average, which conversely indicates 
that the TRIR in NL is lower than the TRIR global average 
 
Factor NFLD Factor Exponent
Value placed on life 9 Value placed on life 0.2
Price of oil 10 Price of oil 0
Shareholder pressure 3 Shareholder pressure 1.4
Royalty regime 4 Royalty regime 1.2
Safety culture 8 Safety culture 0.40
Safety training 7 Safety training 0.60
Safety procedures 9 Safety procedures 0.20
Attitude 6 Attitude 0.8
Motivation 7 Motivation 0.6
Lack of fatigue 8 Lack of fatigue 0.4
Coordination 5 Coordination 1
Fitness 6 Fitness 0.8
Knowledge 8 Knowledge 0.4
Intelligence 5 Intelligence 1
Safety design 7 Safety design 0.6
Weather 1 Weather 1.8
PPE 9 PPE 0.2
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Once the reliability of the elements of the system for the NL platform has been 
determined, they are substituted in the model and then run for the particular case under 
study.  Figure 5-9 shows the system reliability results of the Monte Carlo simulation run 
for NL platform for the year 2011.  Similarly to what is shown in Figure 5-9, Monte Carlo 
simulations are run to calculate reliability values for each year under study (2000 to 
2011).  Table 5-12 shows a summary of the calculated mean reliabilities for the global 
average conditions and the NL platform safety conditions.   
 
Table 5-12 Calculated Reliabilities (Mean Value) for Average Conditions and NL 
Year Average conditions system reliability NL system reliability 
2000 0.9758 0.9827 
2001 0.953 5 0.9662 
2002 0.9345 0.9519 
2003 0.9165 0.9384 
2004 0.8898 0.9182 
2005 0.8730 0.9055 
2006 0.8562 0.8926 
2007 0.8420 0.8817 
2008 0.8283 0.8712 
2009 0.8172 0.8627 
2010 0.8066 0.8546 
2011 0.7960 0.8465 
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Figure 5-9 Monte Carlo Simulation for NL System Reliability Year 2011 
 
@RISK Output Report for R System NL 
Performed By: PARAND
Date: May-10-13 8:19:24 PM
Workbook Name @RISK simulation for Relia
Number of Simulations 1
Number of Iterations
Number of Inputs 58
Number of Outputs 30
Sampling Type Latin Hypercube
Simulation Start Time
Simulation Duration
Random # Generator
Random Seed
Statistics Percentile
Minimum 0.685951776 5% 0.7646384
Maximum 0.942699907 10% 0.7861208
Mean 0.838653081 15% 0.7977069
Std Dev 0.039726316 20% 0.8078105
Variance 0.00157818 25% 0.8126446
Skewness ‐0.364144507 30% 0.8220942
Kurtosis 3.308940091 35% 0.8276014
Median 0.840611271 40% 0.8308282
Mode 0.806948538 45% 0.8354278
Left X 0.764638394 50% 0.8406113
Left P 5% 55% 0.8459519
Right X 0.897537935 60% 0.8510668
Right P 95% 65% 0.8550511
Diff X 0.132899541 70% 0.8599902
Diff P 90% 75% 0.866287
#Errors 41 80% 0.8732947
Filter Min Off 85% 0.8800286
Filter Max Off 90% 0.8860159
#Filtered 0 95% 0.8975379
Rank Name Lower Upper
1 Price of oil / Safet0.8167327 0.8617053
2 Value Placed on L0.8161173 0.8607721
3 Motivation / Scor 0.8152105 0.8587799
4 Weather / Score 0.8199724 0.8617761
5 Value Placed on L0.8158856 0.8561977
6 Attitude / Score 0.8146627 0.8517117
7 Royalty regime / T0.8233591 0.8552587
8 Safety culture / Sa0.8183489 0.8499201
9 Price of oil / Train0.8283792 0.8585463
10 Shareholder pres 0.8242881 0.8543711
11 Shareholder pres 0.8272186 0.8569766
12 Procedures / Safe0.8260219 0.8541295
13 Training / Safety d0.8296528 0.8570815
14 Procedures / Kno 0.8263379 0.853114
Simulation Summary Information
Change in Output Statistic for  R System NL
500
10/05/2013 20:18
00:00:02
Mersenne Twister
623937671
Summary Statistics for R System NL
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5.4.3 Model Validation 
To assess the effectiveness of the model, the estimated reliability values presented in 
Table 5-12 were transformed into predictions of the number of accidents per year (TRIR) 
and then compared with the TRIR data (OGP data for global average and CNLOPB data 
for NL).  The results of the comparison are presented in Table 5-13.  
 
Table 5-13 Estimated TRIR for Global and NL Operations versus Obtained Data 
 OGP (TRIR) CNLOPB (TRIR) 
Year original data 
transformed 
data 
(100 
workers) 
estimated 
with 
model 
(100 
workers) 
%Error original data 
transformed 
data 
(100 
workers) 
estimated 
with 
model 
(100 
workers) 
%Error 
2000 7.64 3.35 2.42 -27.84 10.16 4.45 1.77 -60.23 
2001 5.90 2.59 2.18 -15.71 9.49 4.16 1.61 -61.36 
2002 4.78 2.09 2.06 -1.59 8.04 3.52 1.52 -56.91 
2003 4.15 1.82 1.97 8.33 11.45 5.02 1.46 -70.93 
2004 5.87 2.57 1.91 -25.76 4.36 1.91 1.41 -26.02 
2005 3.93 1.72 1.86 8.00 6.01 2.63 1.38 -47.68 
2006 3.73 1.64 1.82 10.73 6.59 2.89 1.35 -53.30 
2007 3.26 1.43 1.78 24.52 6.57 2.88 1.32 -54.03 
2008 3.09 1.35 1.75 29.64 8.51 3.73 1.30 -65.09 
2009 2.70 1.18 1.72 46.04 8.09 3.55 1.28 -63.82 
2010 2.35 1.03 1.70 64.97 4.31 1.89 1.27 -32.98 
2011 2.83 1.24 1.68 35.29 5.29 2.32 1.25 -46.06 
 
It is important to note that the original CNLOPB data is transformed similarly as the 
original OGP data (refer to Section 5.2.2).  This transformation is based on the 
assumption that 100 people are operating in an offshore platform and 50% of them are 
working continuously all year round.   
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The results presented in Table 5-13 are summarized and illustrated in Figure 5-10.  The 
figure shows that the number of recorded injuries decreases with time in all cases.  The 
most significant difference between estimated values and real data is that the estimated 
values tend to present smoother trend lines than the actual real data.  The reason is that 
the real data includes certain degree of randomness, but the estimated values are based on 
a general trend. 
 
 
Figure 5-10 Estimated TRIR for Global and NL Operations versus Obtained Data 
 
Larger discrepancies between the estimated TRIR and the data of TRIR are found in the 
first years of study (i.e. 2000, 2001) for the global average and NL cases.  These results 
can be explained as follows:   
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The TRIR data values are relatively small and are showing a decreasing trend by year.  
For example, looking at the OGP data, TRIR values in 2000 and 2011 were 7.64 and 
2.83, respectively. When the data are transformed for 100 people working in a platform, 
the TRIR values become 3.35 and 1.24, respectively, for 2000 and 2011 (Table 5-13).  It 
should be noted that since the TRIR values are small a small changes results in a large 
error.  Nonetheless, the magnitude of the errors also decrease and this is an iterative 
process that improves with time as more data become available. As such, the large errors 
presented on Table 5-13 do not necessarily indicate poor results on the estimation of 
TRIR values.  Therefore, we can consider that the estimation for global average 
conditions is reasonably close to the data.   
 
The NL statistics (i.e. TRIR data) is more sensitive than the global average.  Therefore, 
the NL data is more spread than the global average.  The reason is that the data is based in 
a few numbers of platforms; so changes in one will affect considerably the overall 
statistics (Refer to Figure 5-10).  
 
When comparing errors found for global average conditions and NL platforms it has been 
observed that larger errors are related to NL case.  The main reason is that the collected 
data do not reflect the experts' opinion (experts' opinion is a key element for model 
calibration).  The experts' opinion, rated the Newfoundland offshore safety environment 
equal or superior to the average global situation in more than 86% 
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(Attwood 2006, pp., 225).  However, the data shows that global average has a better 
safety performance with lower TRIR (refer to Table 5-13 and Figure 5-10). 
 
Although, similar performance indicators are being compared (TRIR for OGP and RIFR 
for NL), unexpected results are seen.  As explained above the Newfoundland safety 
performance is significantly worse than global average in most of the years, with 
exception of the year 2004.  Similar results were found by Attwood (2006) for the period 
of his research (2000-2004).  
 
Attwood (2006) provided some possible explanations to justify these results.  First, 
Attwood suggested that the RIFR database was possibly contaminated by inclusion of 
data from workgroups other than offshore platforms.  This supposition was confirmed in 
this research (Figure 5-11) where air transport, sea transport and diving have been 
included in the CNLOPB injury statistics.  On the contrary, the global average statistics 
does not consider accidents outside offshore installations (Figure 2-1).   
 
The second explanation has to do with the over reporting of occupational accidents due to 
formed worker unions.  It is possible to see that the differences are persisting and that in 
general the trends have not changed from year 2005 to 2011.   
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Figure 5-11 CNLOPB Injuries Report Pie Chart  
 
It can also be argued that the sources of error may directly be associated with the model, 
particularly "expert opinion" gathered data.  Where large errors mean that the data do not 
reflect real safety conditions of the specific case study.  To assess these options it is 
recommended first to discard the two explanations presented above.  Then, safety data for 
NL should be extracted from OGP reports instead from CNLOPB reports.  In order to 
perform this task an extensive data processing of OGP reports is required.  Such level 
data interrogation was beyond the scope of this project and the main objective sought was 
to transform the model from a deterministic framework to a probabilistic one with a 
further development of the risk assessment tool.  
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Usually main safety statistics are reported in OGP documents by regions; such as North 
America (which includes USA and Canada).  In the data often offshore and onshore 
statistics are mixed and presented as a single safety indicator.  Therefore they cannot be 
used directly to extract offshore safety parameters for a specific region such as NL.  
However, the OGP documents have an appendix section, in which each reported accident 
or incident has been briefly described, although operators name and sometimes specific 
location details is kept anonymous.  Detailed analysis of the appendices may give the 
estimated NL safety indicators required for the comparison and model calibration and 
therefore, clarify the real source of the problem.    
 
The discrepancies between the data and the results predicted by the model for the NL 
offshore platform make difficult the task of model validation.  In order to have an 
accurate model validation, it is necessary to ensure that the data collected for the case 
study followed the same format and procedures as the global average data.  These 
statistics mainly depend on the safety requirements of the region, country or the operator 
where offshore the facility is operating. 
 
This research is the first step forward towards development of a probabilistic model.  It is 
acknowledged that, model validation is required to prove the operability of the model.  
This research has served to clearly identify specific problems obstructing model 
validation and therefore clear recommendations are implemented for future work. 
Application of the Proposed Reliability Model for Predicting Safety Performance 
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5.4.4 Application of the Proposed Reliability Model for Predicting Safety 
Performance 
The model can be further used to estimate future TRIR indices or other safety 
performance indicators.  In order to do this, the reliability values should be used to 
calculate a two-parameter Weibull distribution (θ and β) that fits system reliability 
outputs (as described in Section 5.3.1).  The MATLAB code (see appendix IV) developed 
for Task 3 should be used again to re-calculate θ and β parameters.  Once the parameters 
are calculated, the reliability values can be obtained for any time in the future and 
therefore the failure probabilities and then TRIR or any other desired safety performance 
indicator.  This approach can be used for elements of the model or overall system 
reliability.  The advantage of using this tool is the possibility to predict safety conditions 
at any specific point in time. Further, it can be used to identify elements of the system that 
require improvement to reduce overall incidents.  For example, Table 5-14 presents the 
estimated Weibull parameters for global average conditions and NL specific case.   
Table 5-14 Estimated Weibull Parameters for Average Conditions and NL Platform 
 Average Conditions 
Parameters 
NL 
Parameters 
θ 65.21 91.36 
β 0.853 0.86 
 
Task 5: Risk Calculation  
Risk is essentially a combination of the likelihood that an event will occur, along with the 
severity of consequences if it does occur.  By combining severity and likelihood, an 
organization can have the most complete picture possible and can rationally make 
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assessments about which risks should be given the priority.  While risk analysis cannot 
predict the future with certainty, it can help to select the best strategies based on the 
available information.  
 
Previous sections of this document have been developed in order to calculate the 
likelihood of an occupational accident happening in an offshore platform.  Monte Carlo 
simulations where performed to obtain number of occupational accidents as a 
probabilistic outcome (in terms of TRIR) in a unit year.  The following sections describe 
how severity is classified for the risk calulcations. 
 
5.4.5 Classification of Severity of Occupational Accidents 
The severity of occupational accidents in offshore platforms can be classified using the 
classification system proposed by the Health and Safety Report prepared by Det Norske 
Veritas Industry AS, for the Health and Safety Organization of United Kingdom (Det 
Norske Veritas Industry 2003) .  This classification is presented below in Table 5-15. 
 
Table 5-15  Severity of Occupational Accidents in Offshore Platforms (Det Norske Veritas 
Industry 2003) 
Occurrence Severity Level Description 
Fatality Considered as a Catastrophic 
outcome 
Major Injury Considered as a Significant 
outcome 
Over Three day Injury Considered as a Moderate 
outcome 
Dangerous Occurrence Considered as a low risk 
outcome 
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The following is a summary of the definition of some of the terms presented in Table 
5-15 that require a more precise description.  The description is based on the Reporting of 
Injuries Disease and Dangerous Occurrences Regulation (RIDDOR) 1995: 
 
Major Injury includes the following (UK 1995; UK. 1995): 
 Any fracture other than finger, thumb or toes. 
 Any dislocation of shoulder, hip, knee or spine. 
 Any amputation. 
 Loss of the sight of an eye (whether temporary or permanent). 
 Chemical or hot metal burn to the eye or any penetrating injury to the eye. 
 Any injury which results in electric shock and electric burns leading to 
unconsciousness and requires resuscitation or admittance to hospital for 24 hours 
or more. 
 Any other injury leading to hypothermia, heat induced illness or unconsciousness 
requiring resuscitation or admittance to hospital for 24 hours or more. 
 Loss of consciousness caused by asphyxia or lack of oxygen or exposure to a 
biological agent or harmful substance. 
 Absorption of any substance by inhalation, skin or ingestion causing loss of 
consciousness or acute illness requiring medical treatment. 
 Acute illness requiring medical treatment where there is reason to believe the 
exposure was to biological agents, its toxins or infected materials. 
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Dangerous Occurrences includes the following (UK. 1995): 
 
 Collapse of, the overturning of, or the failure of any load bearing part of any 
lifting machinery (includes lifts, hoists, cradles, access platforms, excavators, pile 
driving frames and fork lift trucks). 
 Pressure systems -The failure of any closed vessel (including a boiler or boiler 
tube) or associated pipe work. 
 Freight containers - The failure of any freight container in any of its load-bearing 
parts while it is being raised, lowered or suspended. 
 Overhead power lines - where plant or equipment comes into contact with 
insulated lines with voltage exceeding 200 volts, or causes an electrical discharge 
by coming into close proximity with the overhead line. 
 Electrical short circuits or overloads attended by fire or explosion which causes 
stoppage of plant involved for more than 24 hours, or has the potential to cause 
the death of a person. 
 Explosives causing injury to a person, projection of material beyond the boundary 
of the site, misfires, failure of shots, unintentional discharges or ignition of 
explosives. 
 Explosions or fires caused by explosion. 
 Escape of substances. 
 Escape of flammable substances. 
 Escape of biological agents. 
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 Collapse of scaffolding, building or structure. 
 Carriage of dangerous substances by road. 
 Incidents involving wells, pipelines or pipeline works. 
 
Once the Severity of an activity has been identified, then this can be factored by the 
likelihood in order to obtain the risk estimation.  The analysis can qualitative or 
quantitative. 
 
The TRIR safety indicator has been used in earlier sections of this research for three 
reasons: first, it is a very common safety performance indicator; second, is data frequently 
available for the public and third; because mostly (but not entirely) accounts for events 
considered of high frequency and low severity.  Strictly speaking the TRIR safety 
indicator describes the number of recordable injuries which includes: fatalities + lost 
work day cases + restricted work day cases + medical treatment cases; per 1,000000 
hours worked.  However, fatalities accounts for a very small portion of the TRIR overall 
numerical value and can be disregarded. 
 
Therefore, given that the TRIR encloses all severity categories presented in Table 5-15 it 
and cannot be used as the likelihood of a particular severity classification.  More detailed 
and segmented statistical data is necessary to get appropriate quantitative risk estimation 
(i.e data from fatally, major injury, over three day injury or dangerous occurrence).   The 
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following section will present the steps to follow in order to perform a quantitative risk 
assessment. 
 
5.4.6 Quantitative Occupational Risk Assessment for Offshore Operations 
The quantification of occupational risk is usually calculated and presented in terms of 
Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA).  One needs to select the safety indicator of its interest 
to obtain the related IRPA.  As explained above, TRIR it is a broader safety indicator that 
encompasses all severity categories. Therefore, it is not considered as an option for the 
risk assessment developed in this section.  If statistical data were available for the four 
severity categories then the IRPA for each category can be numerically calculated.  
Ideally data describing major injury, over three day injury or dangerous occurrence will 
be a perfect fit for the representation of low severity high frequency accidents.  
Unfortunately, data that describes major injury, over three day injury or dangerous 
occurrence is not readily available for the public.   
 
From the four Severity Categories presented above, fatality can be described with the 
Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) statistics of an offshore platform.  This safety indicator is 
frequently available for the public in offshore databases (such as OGP database or 
CNLOPB data base) and will serve as a perfect example in order to layout the 
methodology for the risk assessment analysis.   
In order to assess IRPA for fatalities, FAR data needs to be converted to IRPA values 
using actual work pattern data.  It is important to mention that offshore personnel may be 
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exposed to risk whilst off shift and in the time of their rotation.  However, for this 
particular research it is assumed that the exposure time is just during working hours 
(normally 12 hours a day). 
 
The Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA) for fatalities is then calculated by the following 
equation: 
8)20112000( 10
/__ yearpersonhourWorkingFARIRPA  
 
 
Where, the representative FAR for the years 2000 to 2011 can be estimated using the 
Probabilistic Reliability Model and the Monte Carlo Simulations.  The method is similar 
to that developed in this research for estimating TRIR.   
 
Table 5-16 presents the FAR data exclusively for offshore activities.  It should be noted 
that the OGP Safety Indicators reports (from 2000 to 2011) do not directly provide the 
FAR data for offshore and therefore, additional processing is required to extract data for 
offshore activities. This was done using the total number of work hours for offshore 
activities, and the numbers of fatalities corresponding to offshore activities.  OGP data 
was selected instead of CNLOPB data for this analysis since the third parties and air 
transport fatalities can be excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 5-16 Offshore FAR Excluding Third Parties and Air Transport Fatalities (Using the Oil 
and Gas Producers Database) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Calculated 
Offshore 
FAR 
3.77 4.25 2.43 3.02 3.39 1.99 1.44 2.62 1.45 1.77 2.01 1.20 
 
A distribution function was then fitted to the FAR values using the @RISK software in 
order to develop a probabilistic framework.  The results are presented on Figure 5-12.  An 
exponential distribution was selected as the best fit.  This distribution was used for the 
calculation of the IRPA occupational risk assessment indicator. 
 
 
Figure 5-12 Fitting Distribution to Estimate Offshore Fatality Accident Rate (FAR) Values 
(from 2000 to 2011) 
 
The other variable "working hours person/year" can be defined with a normal distribution.  
The OGP report of 2011 defines the actual "hours worked" for offshore workers as the 
number of hours calculated on a 12 hours’ workday.  Consequently the average hours 
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worked per year varies from 1600 to 2300 hours/person (averaging 2000) depending upon 
the shift on/off ratio.  This value can be transformed into a normal distribution with a 
mean 2000 hours/person and a standard deviation of 350 hours/person (Figure 5-13).  The 
normal distribution was selected to best describe this parameter for two reasons: i) most 
of the data are near the middle datum or average of the sample and ii) very few data is 
near the upper or lower extremes. 
 
 
Figure 5-13 Working Hours per Year as Normal Distribution 
 
A Monte Carlo simulation was run to obtain the corresponding IRPA.  As shown in 
Figure 5-14 IRPA mean value is about 5x10-5 and the 95 percentile of IRPA is 
approximately 1x10-4.  It is extremely valuable to get the results as a distribution of 
possible outcomes, since it allows evaluation of extreme probabilities (such as the ones 
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corresponding to the distribution tale) which is one of the major objectives of performing 
quantitative risk analysis when assessing worst case scenario conditions.   
 
 
Figure 5-14 Monte Carlo Simulation for the Estimation of IRPA 
 
The estimated risk values (IRPA results obtained as a Monte Carlo Simulations) are then 
compared to the acceptance criteria.  One example largely used in offshore operations is 
the "ALARP Triangle" (As Low as Reasonably Practicable), refer to Figure 5-15.  
ALARP is a term used by some companies and regulators to provide a framework for 
deciding on the level of investment needed for safety programs. 
 
In the lower region of the ALARP triangle the risk is considered negligible, provided that 
normal precautions are maintained.  In this case, the organization or company may spend 
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resources more effectively elsewhere to improve safety, rather than trying to reduce these 
risks any further. 
 
 
Figure 5-15 ALARP Triangle (From an anonymous company, HSE Manual) 
 
The upper region of the ALARP triangle represents an intolerable risk level, where risk 
must be reduced.  The area in between is the so-called “ALARP Region”.  Within this 
region, decisions on the risk tolerability will have to be based on a balance between 
business and safety objectives, which will depend on the degree of difficulty to make 
further improvements.  This forms the basis for the “ALARP Principle” whereby any risk 
that lies between intolerable and negligible levels must be reduced so far as reasonably 
practicable, or to a level which is “As Low As Reasonably Practicable” (ALARP). 
For example, the HSE Manual of an anonymous company has the following guidelines 
for analysis of risk tolerability regarding worker fatalities: 
IRPA
10-3/yr
10-4/yr
10-5/yr
10-6/yr
Intolerable
The ALARP or Tolerable
region (Risk is tolerated only)
Broadly Acceptable region
(no need for detailed working to
demonstrate ALARP)
Fundamental improvements needed.
Only to be considered if there are no
alternatives and people are well informed
Too high, significant effort required to
improve
High, investigate alternatives
Low, consider cost-effective alternatives
Negligible, maintain normal precautions
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“While it is clearly not possible to set single quantitative guidelines on risk acceptability, 
some broad indicators of the current position can be noted.  If the average expectation of 
life is 70-75 years, then the imposition of a continuing annual risk of death to the 
individual of 0.01 (one in one hundred years) seems unacceptable.  At 0.001 (one in one 
thousand years), it may not be totally unacceptable if the individual knows of the 
situation, enjoys come commensurate benefit, and everything reasonable has been done 
to reduce the risk.  Broadly, a risk of death of 1 in 1000 per annum is about the most that 
is ordinarily accepted under modern conditions for workers and it seems reasonable to 
adopt it as the dividing line between what is just tolerable and what is intolerable.”  
 
Nonetheless, within this company, an average risk of fatality derived for onshore workers 
historical statistics is approximately 2.3 fatalities per 10,000 man-years (2.3 x 10-4 
fatalities per annum).  As a result, work related individual risk in the range of 1 fatality in 
1000 man-years to 1 fatality in 10,000 man years is still considered too high under the 
company's safety standards (Refer to Figure 5-15, ALARP triangle).  Examples of the 
average onshore worker risks in comparison to the “ordinary risks of life” are presented in 
Table 5-17. 
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Table 5-17 Examples of Risk Fatality/Year (Anonymous Company) 
Risk of Fatality/year Cause of Risk 
1 in 1000 1 x 10-3 Risk of death in high risk groups within relatively 
“risky” industries, e.g. mining 
2.3 in 10,000 2.3 x 10-4 Average risk of death for onshore staff 
1 in 10,000 1 x 10-4 General risk of death in traffic accident (UK) 
1 in 100,000 1 x 10-5 Risk of death in an accident at work in the very 
safest parts of industry 
1 in 1 million 1 x 10-6 General risk of death in a fire or explosion from gas 
at home 
1 in 10 million 1 x 10-7 Risk of death by being struck by lightning 
 
The mean value of the IRPA results is 5x10-5 and the 95 percentile 1x10-4 (Figure 5-14). 
These results are compared against the ALARP triangle on Figure 5-15.  The 95 
percentile result (worst case scenario) lies in the ALARP or "tolerable region", which 
means that alternatives should be investigated and risk tolerability will have to be based 
between balance of business and safety objectives.  However, the IRPA mean value lies 
in the "broadly acceptable" region, so no further analysis is required. 
 
This analysis shows that global average offshore fatalities lie within ALARP region.  The 
above analysis demonstrates the application of the proposed approach.  Similar analyses 
can be performed for the other three severity classifications (Major injury, over three day 
injury and dangerous occurrence).  However, other ALARP triangles have to be 
specifically created to assess risk levels of each classification taking into account 
regulations and organizational safety standards.  Also, specific data within each category 
has to be gathered to achieve this objective.  Those risk analyses then can be used to 
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improve safety conditions of offshore operations and allocate deployment of resources 
using the model in order to improve the overall safety. 
 
Calculated risk levels are usually compared with the acceptance criteria set by the 
organization and/or policies and regulations governing the region under study.  Options of 
risk reducing measures should always be addressed.  The process may include a re-
evaluation of the risks and of risk reduction measures based on cost-benefit analysis (part 
of ALARP evaluation). 
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS 
The Attwood's reliability model (Attwood 2006) for the quantification of occupational 
accidents in the oil and gas industry has been revised in its entirety from a deterministic 
framework to a probabilistic approach.  As a result a completely new model approach has 
been developed and proposed for occupational accident hind cast and forecast analyses.  
Important changes have been made in the numerical approach for the model calibration 
and model application sections.  In addition, Attwood's model was extended a step 
forward to be used as an occupational risk estimation tool.  The modifications have 
helped to overcome fundamental assumptions and improve accident rate prediction and 
also increase the model capability.  These modifications are summarized as follows: 
 
 Development of a probabilistic approach: The model variables have been 
transformed and introduced as probabilistic values (functions describing variable 
characteristics) with the objective of more realistically representing the 
uncertainties associated with each model element and overall outcome. 
 Modifications in model calibration: Important modifications and corrections to the 
Attwood's approach have been implemented for model calibration.  The model has 
been calibrated using global data as system of seven equations with seven 
unknowns.  A large volume of data from OGP reports (from 2000 to 2012) were 
extracted and analyzed for this task.  The regional OGP data (from seven regions 
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worldwide) were used to solve the proposed new equations using a code 
developed in the commercially available software, MATLAB. 
 Development of Monte Carlo simulations to get probabilistic outcomes of the 
model:  This approach was an entirely a new contribution to the model.  Monte 
Carlo simulations are widely used in risk analysis, given that there is significant 
uncertainty in the input variables.  
 Modification in expert survey analysis: Important modifications have been 
implemented to this portion of the research in order to fit the changes applied to 
the model. 
 Testing and validations. 
 Risk estimation: This is an entire new step implemented to the model for the 
occupational risk assessment of offshore operations. 
 
The use of a probabilistic approach in the estimation of occupational accidents is a 
considerable upgrade to the original model (deterministic approach).  Single-point risk 
assessment methods, place the risk assessor, regulatory agencies and the public in a very 
difficult position, given the uncertainty associated to the estimation of risk.  The risk 
estimated using the deterministic approach may have span of uncertainty of several orders 
of magnitude.  This can be particularly critical in cases where the single risk estimate is 
close to the maximum acceptable level.  To this end, Monte Carlo simulation has proven 
to be a very useful tool in risk analysis, furnishing the decision-maker with a range of 
possible outcomes and their respective probabilities of occurrence.  Though the numerical 
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simulation process is inherently complex, tools such as @RISK can assist for the 
simulations.  The results from Monte Carlo simulation cover a wide range of possible 
outcomes and their likelihood in simple graphs and tables that can be easily understood. 
 
The literature shows that various quantitative models have been developed to address 
accidents of high severity though low-frequency (such as transport accidents, explosions, 
etc.) in the offshore oil and gas industry; given that this accidents have a strong impact in 
the public opinion.  Nonetheless, there is still a lack of quantitative models for low 
severity high frequency accidents, which in time can impose similar danger and represent 
a large percentage of the annual occupational accidents in the offshore oil and gas sector.  
The utilization of quantitative models for such accidents considerably improves accident's 
analysis.  Therefore more effective measures can be implemented in strategic way to 
further reduce the number of occupational accidents in the offshore oil and gas 
operations. 
 
Like any other occupational accident model, the proposed Occupational Risk Assessment 
Model relies on expert opinion.  This introduces certain advantage and also limitations to 
the model.  The advantage is that expert opinion helps to update and revise constantly the 
model and therefore helping to adapt to the ever-changing environment and working 
conditions of offshore installations.  On the other hand, the disadvantage is that the 
accuracy of the prediction depends largely on the experts' knowledge.  Therefore, it is 
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crucial to carefully select the panel of experts that reflect experience and understanding of 
offshore operations for the case under consideration. 
 
The risk evaluation tasks depend on the purpose of the quantitative risk assessment.  The 
risk calculated is compared with the acceptance criteria set by the organization and/or 
policies and regulations that may vary region to region.  Identification of possible risk 
reducing measures should also be performed throughout and as a part of the risk 
assessment process.  One option will involve the identification of the model elements that 
have more influence in the final risk estimation.   
 
At the end, the approach adopted in this work provided invaluable insights into the 
understanding of the various factors involved in the risk analysis related to occupational 
accidents in offshore operations and provided a methodology for its estimation.  The 
holistic approach of the proposed model provides a more realistic representation of the 
factors influencing safety.  The proposed approach allows each factor to be assessed 
separately and independently from others to evaluate its contribution to the overall safety.  
To this end, the proposed model will allow the implementation of specific correction 
measures to improve the overall safety.  The probabilistic approach and the Monte Carlo 
simulations help to get a probabilistic outcome, where a range of all possible scenarios 
are included; such as: best average and worst.  This will allow a more accurate 
deployment of resources to key elements in order to improve the overall safety to a 
particular desired condition.  In summary, the proposed method is a useful tool for:  
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prediction of occupational accidents likelihood on a specific offshore platform, estimation 
of accident rate, allocator of resources to specific key entities of the model to produce 
optimal safety results as well as occupational risk estimator.  Overall, such an approach 
worth pursuing and there is significant room to advance the state-of-the-art.   
 
The following recommendations are proposed for future studies: 
 The Risk Analysis portion of the model can be further improved by creating a 
numerical acceptance criteria tailored for each one of the severity classifications 
presented in this thesis.  For example, ALARP triangles can be developed for 
major injury, over three day injury and dangerous occurrence independently.  In 
order to fulfill this task, detailed accident data as well as occupational safety 
guidelines have to compile to produce representative and useful risk estimation for 
each category. 
 
 In order to produce reliable results during model application it is imperative that 
the data being collected for analysis describes the same safety performance 
indicator than the global data used for the model calibration.  
 
 Further work can also be performed to assess and to identify the key elements of 
the model for a specific offshore platform and study the implication of the 
improvement of their specific reliability value and their impact in the overall risk 
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analysis.  This information can be crucial for a strategic deployment of site-
specific or region-specific resources in order to reduce the overall risk. 
 
 Further, this model can be used as a tool for identification of key elements of 
occupational accidents and overall risk reduction for any offshore facility.  
Further, it can be used as a cost estimator of deployment of resources to particular 
elements of the model in order to obtain desired results.  Academic exercises of 
case specific platforms are recommended. 
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Appendix I 
Safety Performance Indicators –Summary of OGP Data for Offshore Operations 
(Contractors and Companies) from year 2000 to 2011.   
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Safety Performance Indicators – Summary of OGP data 2011 
Region Type hours- worked 
No. 
Fatalities 
No. 
LWDCs 
No. 
RWDCs 
No. 
MTCs FAR LTIF TRIR
Africa 
company 15,455,000 0 7 6 11 0.00 0.45 1.55 
contractor 86,965,000 2 59 77 133 2.30 0.70 3.14 
subtotal offshore 102,420,000 2 66 83 144 1.95 0.66 2.88 
Asia/ 
Australasia 
company 29,308,000 0 5 11 21 0.00 0.17 1.26 
contractor 152,264,000 4 71 74 87 2.63 0.49 1.53 
subtotal offshore 181,572,000 4 76 85 108 2.20 0.44 1.50 
Europe 
company 28,753,000 0 27 8 46 0.00 0.94 2.82 
contractor 127,206,000 2 205 92 291 1.57 1.63 4.64 
subtotal offshore 155,959,000 2 232 100 337 1.28 1.50 4.30 
FSU 
company 8,889,000 0 6 3 3 0.00 0.67 1.40 
contractor 45,581,000 0 19 28 32 0.00 0.42 1.81 
subtotal offshore 54,470,000 0 25 31 35 0.00 0.46 1.67 
Middle East 
company 10,832,000 0 1 2 3 0.00 0.09 0.55 
contractor 45,988,000 0 12 12 42 0.00 0.26 1.43 
subtotal offshore 56,820,000 0 13 14 45 0.00 0.23 1.27 
North America 
company 10,977,000 0 8 7 6 0.00 0.73 1.91 
contractor 42,022,000 0 18 30 47 0.00 0.43 2.26 
subtotal offshore 52,999,000 0 26 37 53 0.00 0.49 2.19 
South America 
company 26,470,000 1 18 8 55 3.78 0.72 3.10 
contractor 145,768,000 4 102 180 311 2.74 0.73 4.10 
subtotal offshore 172,238,000 5 120 188 366 2.90 0.73 3.94 
  TOTAL 2011 776,478,000 13 558 538 1,088 1.67 0.74 2.83 
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Safety Performance Indicators – Summary of OGP data 2010 
Region Type hours- worked 
No  
Fatalities 
No. 
 LWDCs 
No. 
RWDCs 
No. 
 MTCs FAR LTIF TRIR 
Africa 
company 26,210,000 1 16 9 15 3.82 0.27 1.18 
contractor 158,558,000 8 46 94 156 5.05 0.34 1.92 
subtotal offshore 184,768,000 9 62 103 171 4.87 0.38 1.87 
Asia/ 
Australasia 
company 33,330,000 0 16 11 22 0.00 0.48 1.47 
contractor 232,947,000 5 70 125 166 2.15 0.32 1.57 
subtotal offshore 266,277,000 5 86 136 188 1.88 0.34 1.56 
Europe 
company 26,897,000 0 34 11 46 0.00 1.26 3.38 
contractor 115,879,000 0 169 118 262 0.00 1.46 4.74 
subtotal offshore 142,776,000 0 203 129 308 0.00 1.42 4.48 
FSU 
company 8,098,000 0 0 1 1 0.00 0.00 0.25 
contractor 35,813,000 0 24 22 31 0.00 0.67 2.15 
subtotal offshore 43,911,000 0 24 23 32 0.00 0.55 1.80 
Middle East 
company 78,665,000 0 29 11 40 0.00 0.37 1.02 
contractor 39,726,000 2 21 14 68 5.03 0.58 2.64 
subtotal offshore 118,391,000 2 50 25 108 1.69 0.44 1.56 
North America 
company 14,072,000 0 5 3 15 0.00 0.36 1.63 
contractor 41,591,000 12 24 33 53 28.85 0.87 2.93 
subtotal offshore 55,663,000 12 29 36 68 21.56 0.74 2.60 
South America 
company 28,454,000 0 14 9 24 0.00 0.49 1.65 
contractor 121,078,000 0 91 86 226 0.00 0.75 3.33 
subtotal offshore 149,532,000 0 105 95 250 0.00 0.70 3.01 
TOTAL 2010 961,318,000 28 559 547 1,125 2.91 0.61 2.35 
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Safety Performance Indicators – Summary of OGP data 2009 
Region Type hours- worked 
No. 
Fatalities 
No. 
LWDCs 
No. 
RWDCs 
No. 
MTCs FAR LTIF TRIR
Africa 
company 24,947,000 1 8 5 22 4.01 0.36 1.44 
contractor 154,831,000 3 57 94 159 1.94 0.39 2.03 
subtotal offshore 179,778,000 4 65 99 181 2.22 0.38 1.94 
Asia/ 
Australasia 
company 25,256,000 0 15 7 16 0.00 0.59 1.50 
contractor 163,130,000 4 86 81 155 2.45 0.55 2.00 
subtotal offshore 188,386,000 4 101 88 171 2.12 0.56 1.93 
Europe 
company 27,292,000 0 33 11 50 0.00 1.21 3.54 
contractor 113,338,000 2 207 118 316 1.76 1.84 5.68 
subtotal offshore 140,630,000 2 240 129 366 1.42 1.72 5.24 
FSU 
company 3,086,000 0 0 0 1 0.00 0.00 0.32 
contractor 11,607,000 1 0 8 7 8.62 0.09 1.38 
subtotal offshore 14,693,000 1 0 8 8 6.81 0.07 1.16 
Middle East 
company 9,098,000 0 4 2 7 0.00 0.44 1.43 
contractor 63,533,000 0 21 17 70 0.00 0.33 1.70 
subtotal offshore 72,631,000 0 25 19 77 0.00 0.34 1.67 
North America 
company 13,015,000 0 5 13 10 0.00 0.38 2.15 
contractor 47,187,000 10 17 55 83 21.19 0.57 3.48 
subtotal offshore 60,202,000 10 22 68 93 16.61 0.53 3.21 
South America 
company 25,933,000 0 7 16 21 0.00 0.27 1.70 
contractor 108,063,000 1 7 114 188 0.93 0.66 3.45 
subtotal offshore 133,996,000 1 14 130 209 0.75 0.11 2.64 
TOTAL 2009 790,316,000 22 467 541 1,105 2.78 0.62 2.70 
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Safety Performance Indicators – Summary of OGP data 2008 
Region Type hours- worked 
No 
Fatalities 
No. 
LWDCs 
No. 
RWDCs No. MTCs FAR LTIF TRIR
Africa 
company 23,780,000 0 11 10 20 0.00 0.46 1.72 
contractor 155,519,000 4 89 100 198 2.57 0.60 2.51 
subtotal offshore 179,299,000 4 100 110 218 2.23 0.58 2.41 
Asia/ 
Australasia 
company 28,939,000 0 7 6 22 0.00 0.24 1.21 
contractor 166,021,000 4 91 74 171 2.41 0.57 2.05 
subtotal offshore 194,960,000 4 98 80 193 2.05 0.52 1.92 
Europe 
company 27,269,000 0 28 5 77 0.00 1.03 4.03 
contractor 102,608,000 0 212 133 307 0.00 20.70 6.35 
subtotal offshore 129,877,000 0 240 138 384 0.00 1.85 5.87 
FSU 
company 6,484,000 0 0 2 2 0.00 0.00 0.62 
contractor 27,895,000 0 16 31 32 0.00 0.57 2.83 
subtotal offshore 34,379,000 0 16 33 34 0.00 0.47 2.41 
Middle East 
company 4,495,000 0 1 0 3 0.00 0.22 0.89 
contractor 23,418,000 1 23 9 42 4.27 1.02 3.20 
subtotal offshore 27,913,000 1 24 9 45 3.58 0.90 2.83 
North America 
company 10,489,000 0 5 9 8 0.00 0.48 2.10 
contractor 47,250,000 0 16 57 85 0.00 0.34 3.34 
subtotal offshore 57,739,000 0 21 66 93 0.00 0.36 3.12 
South America 
company 24,515,000 0 8 7 13 0.00 0.33 1.14 
contractor 107,629,000 8 90 92 208 7.43 0.91 3.70 
subtotal offshore 132,144,000 8 98 99 221 6.05 0.80 3.22 
TOTAL 2008 756,311,000 17 597 535 1188 2.25 0.81 3.09 
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Safety Performance Indicators – Summary of OGP data 2007 
Region Type hours- worked 
No. 
Fatalities 
No. 
LWDCs 
No. 
RWDCs 
No. 
MTCs FAR LTIF TRIR
Africa 
company 16,126,000 0 6 10 35 0.00 0.37 3.28 
contractor 104,743,000 4 77 63 122 3.82 0.77 2.55 
subtotal offshore 120,869,000 4 83 73 157 3.31 0.72 2.62 
Asia/ 
Australasia 
company 22,480,000 1 9 12 23 4.45 0.44 2.00 
contractor 160,239,000 1 62 90 174 0.62 0.39 2.04 
subtotal offshore 182,719,000 2 71 102 197 1.09 0.40 2.04 
Europe 
company 29,648,000 0 31 11 54 0.00 1.05 3.25 
contractor 107,405,000 9 211 132 394 8.38 2.05 6.96 
subtotal offshore 137,053,000 9 242 143 448 6.57 1.83 6.14 
FSU 
company 3,454,000 0 0 2 0 0.00 0.00 0.58 
contractor 12,815,000 0 17 17 21 0.00 1.33 4.29 
subtotal offshore 16,269,000 0 17 19 21 0.00 1.04 3.50 
Middle East 
company 2,544,000 0 0 0 3 0.00 0.00 1.18 
contractor 19,913,000 1 17 10 31 5.02 0.90 2.96 
subtotal offshore 22,457,000 1 17 10 34 4.45 0.80 2.76 
North America 
company 13,231,000 0 2 10 17 0.00 0.15 2.19 
contractor 46,663,000 1 25 52 73 2.14 0.56 3.24 
subtotal offshore 59,894,000 1 27 62 90 1.67 0.47 3.01 
South America 
company 26,701,000 0 6 8 12 0.00 0.22 0.97 
contractor 83,995,000 2 53 85 122 2.38 0.65 3.12 
subtotal offshore 110,696,000 2 59 93 134 1.81 0.55 2.60 
TOTAL 2007 649,957,000 19 516 502 1081 2.92 0.82 3.26 
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Safety Performance Indicators – Summary of OGP data 2006 
Region Type hours- worked 
No 
Fatalities 
No. 
LWDCs 
No. 
RWDCs 
No. 
MTCs FAR LTIF TRIR
Africa 
company 19,939,000 0 1 3 12 0.00 0.05 0.80 
contractor 117,487,000 0 67 82 163 0.00 0.57 2.66 
subtotal offshore 137,426,000 0 68 85 175 0.00 0.49 2.39 
Asia/ 
Australasia 
company 20,470,000 0 4 1 8 0.00 0.20 0.64 
contractor 125,959,000 4 63 45 128 3.18 0.53 1.91 
subtotal offshore 146,429,000 4 67 46 136 2.73 0.48 1.73 
Europe 
company 26,918,000 0 38 5 64 0.00 1.41 4.02 
contractor 93,865,000 1 238 109 360 1.07 2.55 7.56 
subtotal offshore 120,783,000 1 276 114 424 0.83 2.29 6.75 
FSU 
company 2,448,000 0 0 0 1 0.00 0.00 0.41 
contractor 18,453,000 0 31 16 44 0.00 1.68 4.93 
subtotal offshore 20,901,000 0 31 16 45 0.00 1.48 4.40 
Middle East 
company 6,870,000 0 3 2 13 0.00 0.44 2.64 
contractor 46,203,000 1 39 24 63 2.16 0.87 2.75 
subtotal offshore 53,073,000 1 42 26 76 1.88 0.81 2.73 
North America 
company 23,559,000 0 12 21 48 0.00 0.51 3.44 
contractor 53,958,000 2 32 87 123 3.71 0.63 4.52 
subtotal offshore 77,517,000 2 44 108 171 2.58 0.59 4.19 
South America 
company 38,277,000 0 103 16 17 0.00 2.69 1.74 
contractor 99,702,000 3 144 180 170 3.01 1.47 5.21 
subtotal offshore 137,979,000 3 247 196 187 2.17 1.81 4.59 
TOTAL 2006 694,108,000 11 775 591 1214 1.58 1.13 3.73 
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Safety Performance Indicators – Summary of OGP data 2005 
Region Type hours- worked 
No. 
Fatalities 
No. 
LWDCs 
No. 
RWDCs 
No. 
MTCs FAR LTIF TRIR
Africa 
company 17,335,000 1 10 6 15 5.77 0.63 1.85 
contractor 97,981,000 1 72 86 189 1.02 0.75 3.59 
subtotal offshore 115,316,000 2 82 92 204 1.73 0.73 3.30 
Asia/ 
Australasia 
company 17,219,000 0 12 4 17 0.00 0.70 1.92 
contractor 90,328,000 3 56 55 152 3.32 0.65 2.97 
subtotal offshore 107,547,000 3 68 59 169 2.79 0.66 2.78 
Europe 
company 20,942,000 0 28 8 50 0.00 1.34 4.11 
contractor 74,152,000 1 165 63 292 1.35 2.24 7.03 
subtotal offshore 95,094,000 1 193 71 342 1.05 2.04 6.38 
FSU 
company 2,608,000 0 1 3 4 0.00 0.38 3.07 
contractor 27,526,000 1 11 8 49 3.63 0.44 2.51 
subtotal offshore 30,134,000 1 12 11 53 3.32 0.43 2.56 
Middle East 
company 10,116 0 10 1 11 0.00 0.99 2.17 
contractor 54,348,000 2 41 15 118 3.68 0.79 3.24 
subtotal offshore 54,358,116 2 51 16 129 3.68 0.98 3.64 
North America 
company 10,114,000 0 0 6 11 0.00 0.00 1.68 
contractor 36,737,000 0 21 56 65 0.00 0.57 3.87 
subtotal offshore 46,851,000 0 21 62 76 0.00 0.45 3.39 
South America 
company 14,800,000 0 67 0 26 0.00 4.53 6.28 
contractor 29,455,000 1 62 4 58 3.40 2.14 4.24 
subtotal offshore 44,255,000 1 129 4 84 2.26 2.94 4.93 
TOTAL 2005 493,555,116 10 556 315 1057 2.03 1.15 3.93 
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Safety Performance Indicators – Summary of OGP data 2004 
Region Type 
hours- 
worked 
No. 
 Fatalities 
No. 
 LWDCs 
No. 
RWDCs 
No. 
 MTCs FAR LTIF TRIR
Africa 
company 13,402,000 0 4 4 694 0.00 0.30 52.90
contractor 113,419,000 8 106 55 230 7.05 1.01 5.20 
subtotal offshore 126,821,000 8 110 59 924 6.31 0.93 8.68 
Asia/Australasia 
company 27,248,000 0 15 8 27 0.00 0.55 2.34 
contractor 118,451,000 2 85 36 246 1.69 0.73 3.34 
subtotal offshore 145,699,000 2 100 44 273 1.37 0.70 2.88 
Europe 
company 25,495,000 0 30 5 99 0.00 1.18 5.26 
contractor 68,294,000 0 180 56 413 0.00 2.64 9.50 
subtotal offshore 93,789,000 0 210 61 512 0.00 2.24 8.35 
FSU 
company 2,399,000 0 2 1 5 0.00 0.83 3.33 
contractor 12,701,000 1 5 8 20 7.87 0.47 2.68 
subtotal offshore 15,100,000 1 7 9 25 6.62 0.53 2.78 
Middle East 
company 8,629,000 0 5 2 26 0.00 0.58 3.82 
contractor 45,514,000 4 43 10 92 8.79 1.03 3.27 
subtotal offshore 54,143,000 4 48 12 118 7.39 0.96 3.36 
North America 
company 11,911,000 0 12 6 20 0.00 1.01 3.19 
contractor 43,548,000 14 55 57 126 32.15 1.58 5.79 
subtotal offshore 55,459,000 14 67 63 146 25.24 1.46 5.23 
South America 
company 12,137,000 0 20 0 2 0.00 1.65 0.99 
contractor 28,045 3 76 4 33 10.70 2.82 4.66 
subtotal offshore 12,165,045 3 96 4 35 24.66 8.14 11.34
TOTAL 2004 503,176,045 32 638 252 2033 6.36 1.33 5.87 
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Safety Performance Indicators – Summary of OGP data 2003 
Region Type 
hours- 
worked 
No. 
Fatalities No. LWDCs No.RWDCs No. MTCs FAR LTIF TRIR
Africa 
company 16,825,000 0 8 4 14 0.00 0.48 1.55 
contractor 45,456,000 9 108 44 133 19.80 2.57 6.47 
subtotal offshore 62,281,000 9 116 48 147 14.45 2.01 5.14 
Asia/Australasia 
company 18,371,000 1 5 13 19 5.44 0.33 2.42 
contractor 110,335,000 2 60 48 168 1.81 0.56 2.63 
subtotal offshore 128,706,000 3 65 61 187 2.33 0.53 2.46 
Europe 
company 25,190,000 2 40 9 84 7.94 1.67 5.36 
contractor 73,746,000 1 213 61 553 1.36 2.90 11.23
subtotal offshore 98,936,000 3 253 70 637 3.03 2.59 9.73 
FSU 
company 2,088,000 0 2 0 2 0.00 0.96 1.92 
contractor 7,821,000 0 2 8 11 0.00 0.26 2.69 
subtotal offshore 9,909,000 0 4 8 13 0.00 0.40 2.52 
Middle East 
company 13,649,000 0 6 4 8 0.00 0.44 1.32 
contractor 56,537,000 1 30 23 65 1.77 0.55 2.10 
subtotal offshore 70,186,000 1 36 27 73 1.42 0.53 1.95 
North America 
company 57,868,000 1 81 10 17 1.73 1.42 2.89 
contractor 88,705,000 5 86 55 126 5.64 1.03 5.43 
subtotal offshore 146,573,000 6 167 65 143 4.09 1.18 2.60 
South America 
company 2,290,000 0 0 1 1 0.00 0.00 0.94 
contractor 10,470,000 0 7 13 33 0.00 0.67 5.40 
subtotal offshore 12,760,000 0 7 14 34 0.00 0.55 4.31 
TOTAL 2003 529,351,000 22 648 293 1234 4.16 1.27 4.15 
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Safety Performance Indicators – Summary of OGP data 2002 
Region Type hours- worked 
No. 
Fatalities 
No. 
LWDCs 
No. 
RWDCs 
No. 
MTCs FAR LTIF TRIR
Africa 
company 5,393,000 0 8 1 9 0.00 1.48 3.38 
contractor 36,134,000 2 74 24 122 5.53 2.10 6.31 
subtotal offshore 41,527,000 2 82 25 131 4.82 2.02 5.78 
Asia/Australasia 
company 17,756,000 0 9 12 17 0.00 0.51 2.78 
contractor 100,574,000 1 79 55 203 0.99 0.80 3.62 
subtotal offshore 118,330,000 1 88 67 220 0.85 0.75 3.18 
Europe 
company 25,718,000 3 42 10 76 11.66 1.75 5.72 
contractor 74,450,000 11 217 81 536 14.78 3.06 11.48
subtotal offshore 100,168,000 14 259 91 612 13.98 2.73 9.74 
sFSU 
company 1,373,000 0 0 1 0 0.00 0.00 0.73 
contractor 4,389,000 0 4 1 3 0.00 0.91 1.82 
subtotal offshore 5,762,000 0 4 2 3 0.00 0.69 1.56 
Middle East 
company 9,829,000 0 7 3 9 0.00 0.71 2.00 
contractor 54,932,000 1 42 20 44 1.82 0.78 1.95 
subtotal offshore 64,761,000 1 49 23 53 1.54 0.77 1.95 
North America 
company 53,528,000 0 70 20 21 0.00 1.31 3.81 
contractor 100,281,000 4 172 105 200 3.99 1.76 8.30 
subtotal offshore 153,809,000 4 242 125 221 2.60 1.60 3.85 
South America 
company 1,513,000 0 1 1 3 0.00 0.66 3.75 
contractor 8,293,000 1 14 10 12 12.06 1.81 4.83 
subtotal offshore 9,806,000 1 15 11 15 10.20 1.63 4.28 
TOTAL 2002 494,163,000 23 739 344 1255 4.65 1.54 4.78 
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Safety Performance Indicators – Summary of OGP data 2001 
Region type hours-worked No Fatalities No. LWDCs No.RWDCs No. MTCs FAR LTIF TRIR 
Africa 
company 16,391,000 0 9 1 7 0.00 0.55 0.96 
contractor 51,142,000 4 113 18 107 7.82 2.29 4.57 
subtotal offshore 67,533,000 4 122 19 114 5.92 1.87 3.84 
Asia/Australasia 
company 18,171,000 0 10 14 19 0.00 0.55 2.49 
contractor 83,956,000 3 95 47 201 3.57 1.17 4.60 
subtotal offshore 102,127,000 3 105 61 220 2.94 1.06 3.81 
Europe 
company 19,144,000 0 44 5 79 0.00 2.30 6.93 
contractor 80,454,000 4 294 47 673 4.97 3.70 13.33 
subtotal offshore 99,598,000 4 338 52 752 4.02 3.43 11.51 
FSU 
company 1,417,000 0 0 0 2 0.00 0.00 1.41 
contractor 3,278,000 2 3 2 11 61.01 1.53 5.49 
subtotal offshore 4,695,000 2 3 2 13 42.60 1.06 4.26 
Middle East 
company 7,832,000 0 3 0 13 0.00 0.38 2.88 
contractor 27,588,000 0 24 3 78 0.00 0.87 4.66 
subtotal offshore 35,420,000 0 27 3 91 0.00 0.76 3.42 
North America 
company 37,966,000 0 57 6 38 0.00 1.50 3.89 
contractor 68,149,000 6 114 37 276 8.80 1.76 8.85 
subtotal offshore 106,115,000 6 171 43 314 5.65 1.67 5.03 
South America 
company 1,402,000 0 0 0 1 0.00 0.00 0.72 
contractor 6,409,000 0 9 5 14 0.00 1.40 4.47 
subtotal offshore 7,811,000 0 9 5 15 0.00 1.15 3.71 
TOTAL 2001 423,299,000 19 775 185 1519 4.49 1.88 5.90 
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Safety Performance Indicators – Summary of OGP data 2000 
Region Type hours- worked 
No. 
Fatalities 
No.  
LWDCs 
No. 
RWDCs 
No. 
 MTCs FAR LTIF TRIR
Africa 
company 14,309,000 0 15 2 9 0.00 1.05 1.11 
contractor 44,152,000 2 89 9 102 4.53 2.06 4.31 
subtotal offshore 58,461,000 2 104 11 111 3.42 1.81 3.90 
Asia/ 
Australasia 
company 16,549,000 1 25 13 26 12.05 1.63 4.30 
contractor 66,273,000 4 64 25 176 6.04 1.03 4.57 
subtotal offshore 82,822,000 5 89 38 202 6.04 1.13 4.03 
Europe 
company 20,174,000 0 44 31 99 0.00 2.18 8.99 
contractor 82,324,000 5 312 172 849 6.07 3.85 17.09
subtotal offshore 102,498,000 5 356 203 948 4.88 3.52 14.75
FSU 
company 1,129,000 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
contractor 2,375,000 0 1 0 2 0.00 0.42 1.26 
subtotal offshore 3,504,000 0 1 0 2 0.00 0.29 0.86 
Middle East 
company 2,816,000 0 2 0 4 0.00 0.71 3.30 
contractor 11,818,000 1 35 0 22 8.46 3.05 5.42 
subtotal offshore 14,634,000 1 37 0 26 6.83 2.60 4.37 
North America 
company 35,007,000 1 76 7 27 2.86 2.20 4.48 
contractor 62,599,000 3 145 75 282 4.79 2.36 10.37
subtotal offshore 97,606,000 4 221 82 309 4.10 2.31 6.31 
South America 
company 1,172,000 0 2 0 0 0.00 1.71 1.71 
contractor 3,395,000 0 7 1 15 0.00 2.06 6.77 
subtotal offshore 4,567,000 0 9 1 15 0.00 1.97 5.47 
TOTAL 2000 364,092,000 17 817 335 1613 4.67 2.29 7.64 
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Appendix II 
Normalized survey responses for Influence Coefficients and Strength Values 
The normalized survey responses have been calculated from Appendix 3.1 – Actual 
survey responses (Attwood 2006) 
 
Key: 
A: Americas 
S: Asia 
E: Europe, Middle East, and Africa 
R: Regulator 
U: Researcher 
C: Contractor 
O: Operator 
.   
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Influence Coefficients  
Respondent  Respondent Region A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 
Characteristics Category R R R R R R R R R R U U U U C 
    
  Value place on life 0.28 0.44 0.41 0.53 0.31 0.47 0.47 0.33 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.57 0.44 0.40 0.33 
Influence on  Price of oil 0.24 0.17 0.23 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.25 
Training Shareholder pressure 0.32 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.35 0.24 0.29 0.27 0.36 0.14 0.28 0.25 0.33 
  Royalty regime 0.16 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.28 0.11 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.20 0.08 
  Value place on life 0.28 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.23 0.50 0.32 0.53 0.45 0.50 0.63 0.32 0.36 0.35 
Influence on  Price of oil 0.24 0.17 0.29 0.13 0.08 0.31 0.11 0.27 0.13 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.23 
Procedures Shareholder pressure 0.32 0.17 0.29 0.20 0.25 0.27 0.33 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.38 0.13 0.32 0.18 0.35 
  Royalty regime 0.16 0.17 0.08 0.20 0.33 0.19 0.06 0.18 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.18 0.27 0.08 
  Value place on life 0.28 0.50 0.39 0.47 0.32 0.23 0.53 0.30 0.50 0.45 0.53 0.63 0.40 0.40 0.32 
Influence on  Price of oil 0.24 0.17 0.22 0.13 0.28 0.31 0.11 0.30 0.13 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.20 0.24 
Safety Culture Shareholder pressure 0.32 0.17 0.30 0.20 0.08 0.27 0.32 0.20 0.31 0.27 0.35 0.13 0.30 0.16 0.36 
  Royalty regime 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.20 0.32 0.19 0.05 0.20 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.20 0.24 0.08 
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Influence Coefficient (Cont’d) 
 
Respondent  Respondent Region A16 A17 A18 A19 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 
Characteristics Category O O O O R R R C O R R R R R R 
    
  Value place on life 0.37 0.44 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.44 0.37 0.45 0.42 0.47 0.40 0.50 0.47 0.39 0.42
Influence on  Price of oil 0.26 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.09 0.32 0.13 0.25 0.13 0.12 0.22 0.17
Training Shareholder pressure 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.28 0.26 0.36 0.21 0.33 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.26 0.21
  Royalty regime 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.21 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.21
  Value place on life 0.44 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.56 0.37 0.43 0.44 0.50 0.53 0.63 0.47 0.45 0.42
Influence on  Price of oil 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.28 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.20 0.17
Procedures Shareholder pressure 0.33 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.39 0.28 0.26 0.38 0.22 0.31 0.20 0.13 0.29 0.25 0.21
  Royalty regime 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.00 0.21 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.21
  Value place on life 0.47 0.39 0.42 0.41 0.35 0.56 0.33 0.43 0.47 0.62 0.53 0.63 0.53 0.41 0.32
Influence on  Price of oil 0.16 0.22 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.24 0.15 0.20 0.13 0.11 0.18 0.26
Safety Culture Shareholder pressure 0.32 0.28 0.26 0.32 0.35 0.28 0.33 0.38 0.24 0.15 0.20 0.13 0.26 0.23 0.26
  Royalty regime 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.19 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.18 0.16
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Influence Coefficient (Cont’d) 
Respondent  Respondent Region E7 E8 E9 E10 E11 E12 E13 E14 E15 E16 E17 E18 E19 E20 E21 
Characteristics Category R R R U C C C C C C O O O O O 
    
  Value place on life 0.44 0.44 0.33 0.62 0.57 0.45 0.38 0.20 0.44 0.57 0.47 0.33 0.57 0.44 0.50 
Influence on  Price of oil 0.17 0.17 0.25 0.15 0.14 0.27 0.14 0.40 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.17 0.33 
Training Shareholder pressure 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.33 0.20 0.28 0.21 0.35 0.17 0.21 0.28 0.17 
  Royalty regime 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.20 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.17 0.07 0.11 0.00 
  Value place on life 0.44 0.29 0.40 0.62 0.57 0.42 0.36 0.20 0.42 0.39 0.47 0.40 0.57 0.39 0.50 
Influence on  Price of oil 0.17 0.21 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.29 0.14 0.40 0.21 0.33 0.13 0.20 0.14 0.17 0.33 
Procedures Shareholder pressure 0.28 0.36 0.30 0.15 0.14 0.21 0.36 0.20 0.26 0.17 0.33 0.20 0.21 0.30 0.17 
  Royalty regime 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.20 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.20 0.07 0.13 0.00 
  Value place on life 0.39 0.30 0.38 0.64 0.57 0.56 0.36 0.29 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.57 0.36 0.67 
Influence on  Price of oil 0.17 0.26 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.31 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.18 0.22 
Safety Culture Shareholder pressure 0.33 0.37 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.36 0.18 0.27 0.15 0.36 0.20 0.21 0.27 0.11 
  Royalty regime 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.20 0.07 0.18 0.00 
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Respondent  Respondent Region A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 
Characteristics Category R R R R R R R R R R U U U U C 
 Overall layer  
External 0.26 0.20 0.32 0.29 0.22 0.28 0.20 0.29 0.21 0.29 0.25 0.06 0.47 0.24 0.29 
Corporate 0.43 0.40 0.41 0.36 0.43 0.28 0.50 0.33 0.64 0.38 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.38 0.38 
Direct 0.30 0.40 0.27 0.36 0.35 0.44 0.30 0.38 0.14 0.33 0.42 0.59 0.20 0.38 0.33 
External  Financial 0.56 0.33 0.58 0.45 0.38 0.47 0.44 0.36 0.78 0.44 0.42 0.50 0.58 0.44 0.43 
Elements Value Placed on Life 0.44 0.67 0.42 0.55 0.62 0.53 0.56 0.64 0.22 0.56 0.58 0.50 0.42 0.56 0.57 
 Financial  
Elements 
Price of Oil  0.35 0.33 0.41 0.40 0.24 0.35 0.11 0.41 0.50 0.35 0.14 0.33 0.41 0.27 0.35 
Shareholder pressure 0.41 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.38 0.24 0.78 0.35 0.36 0.30 0.71 0.33 0.29 0.27 0.53 
Royalty regime 0.24 0.33 0.12 0.27 0.38 0.41 0.11 0.24 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.33 0.29 0.47 0.12 
 Corporate layer 
Safety Culture 0.36 0.29 0.33 0.36 0.43 0.31 0.38 0.35 0.32 0.40 0.41 0.29 0.24 0.38 0.43 
Training 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.31 0.35 0.36 0.32 0.27 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Safety Procedures 0.32 0.38 0.33 0.32 0.26 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.28 0.32 0.38 0.43 0.29 0.24 
Direct layer 
 
Behavioural 0.26 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.29 0.25 0.29 0.23 0.26 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.23 
Capability 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.25 0.17 0.21 
Weather 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.20 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.20 0.18 
Safety design 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.26 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.29 0.23 0.18 
PPE 0.21 0.22 0.17 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.20 0.18 0.25 0.14 0.20 0.21 
Behavioural  Attitude 0.53 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.59 0.56 0.59 0.56 0.56 0.47 0.56 0.50 0.62 0.57 0.50 
elements Motivation 0.47 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.53 0.44 0.50 0.38 0.43 0.50 
Capability  Physical 0.33 0.38 0.44 0.42 0.47 0.44 0.38 0.47 0.44 0.43 0.36 0.47 0.38 0.43 0.44 
elements Mental 0.67 0.62 0.56 0.58 0.53 0.56 0.62 0.53 0.56 0.57 0.64 0.53 0.62 0.57 0.56 
Physical 
Capability   
Lack of fatigue 0.45 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.43 0.37 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.43 0.29 0.36 0.38 0.38 
coordination 0.32 0.26 0.39 0.29 0.33 0.30 0.35 0.33 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.29 0.21 0.38 0.33 
Fitness 0.23 0.37 0.26 0.33 0.24 0.33 0.25 0.29 0.33 0.32 0.24 0.43 0.43 0.24 0.29 
Mental  Knowledge  0.53 0.53 0.56 0.60 0.46 0.56 0.56 0.53 0.53 0.47 0.44 0.50 0.62 0.62 0.56 
Capability  Intelligence 0.47 0.47 0.44 0.40 0.54 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.53 0.56 0.50 0.38 0.38 0.44 
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Respondent  Respondent Region A16 A17 A18 A19 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 
Characteristics Category O O O O R R R C O R R R R R R 
  External 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.34 0.32 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.29 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.33 0.25 0.29 
Overall layer Corporate 0.50 0.33 0.39 0.34 0.32 0.39 0.53 0.33 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.33 0.40 0.48 
  Direct 0.31 0.44 0.39 0.31 0.36 0.44 0.37 0.53 0.24 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.33 0.35 0.24 
External  Financial 0.56 0.55 0.36 0.29 0.43 0.88 0.30 0.50 0.22 0.29 0.27 0.09 0.44 0.33 0.40 
Elements Value Placed on Life 0.44 0.45 0.64 0.71 0.57 0.13 0.70 0.50 0.78 0.71 0.73 0.91 0.56 0.67 0.60 
  Price of Oil  0.45 0.00 0.27 0.21 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.17 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.09 0.25 0.33 0.44 
Financial  Shareholder pressure 0.36 0.58 0.45 0.57 0.44 0.53 0.64 0.67 0.33 0.50 0.33 0.45 0.42 0.50 0.28 
Elements Royalty regime 0.18 0.42 0.27 0.21 0.25 0.18 0.09 0.17 0.33 0.17 0.33 0.45 0.33 0.17 0.28 
  Safety Culture 0.38 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.41 0.30 0.45 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.37 0.36 
Corporate layer Training 0.29 0.36 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.33 0.36 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.21 0.36 
  Safety Procedures 0.33 0.27 0.35 0.32 0.38 0.33 0.23 0.37 0.20 0.35 0.39 0.33 0.32 0.42 0.27 
Direct layer Behavioural 0.30 0.23 0.20 0.26 0.24 0.32 0.26 0.31 0.27 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.32 0.26 
  Capability 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.26 0.31 0.24 0.24 0.18 0.24 0.20 0.25 0.26 
  Weather 0.12 0.21 0.20 0.06 0.16 0.18 0.11 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.06 0.20 0.14 0.12 
  Safety design 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.32 0.20 0.15 0.21 0.14 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.11 0.18 
  PPE 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.00 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Behavioural  Attitude 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.62 0.50 0.00 0.56 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.44 0.38 
elements Motivation 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.38 0.50 1.00 0.44 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.56 0.63 
Capability  Physical 0.44 0.38 0.43 0.33 0.31 0.00 0.38 0.40 0.25 0.38 0.38 0.20 0.44 0.36 0.43 
elements Mental 0.56 0.62 0.57 0.67 0.69 1.00 0.62 0.60 0.75 0.62 0.62 0.80 0.56 0.64 0.57 
Physical Lack of fatigue 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.39 0.47 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.44 0.33 
Capability  coordination 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.45 0.33 0.39 0.39 0.26 0.35 0.40 0.33 0.31 0.33 
  Fitness 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.20 0.29 0.26 0.22 0.26 0.25 0.20 0.30 0.25 0.33 
Mental  Knowledge  0.53 0.43 0.53 0.59 0.47 0.64 0.53 0.83 0.50 0.53 0.64 0.43 0.50 0.47 0.38 
Capability  Intelligence 0.47 0.57 0.47 0.41 0.53 0.36 0.47 0.17 0.50 0.47 0.36 0.57 0.50 0.53 0.62 
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Respondent  Respondent Region E7 E8 E9 E10 E11 E12 E13 E14 E15 E16 E17 E18 E19 E20 E21 
Characteristics Category R R R U C C C C C C O O O O O 
  External 0.11 0.22 0.29 0.33 0.32 0.17 0.33 0.17 0.30 0.12 0.29 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.07 
Overall layer Corporate 0.44 0.43 0.38 0.33 0.36 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.43 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.38 0.50 0.67 
  Direct 0.44 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.19 0.33 0.26 0.41 0.24 0.38 0.50 0.38 0.27 
External  Financial 0.30 0.50 0.43 0.43 0.17 0.29 0.57 0.63 0.31 0.70 0.47 0.27 0.50 0.38 0.20 
Elements Value Placed on Life 0.70 0.50 0.57 0.57 0.83 0.71 0.43 0.38 0.69 0.30 0.53 0.73 0.50 0.62 0.80 
  Price of Oil  0.33 0.40 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.38 0.25 0.40 0.33 0.43 0.31 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.17 
Financial  Shareholder pressure 0.44 0.40 0.47 0.50 0.33 0.25 0.40 0.30 0.39 0.33 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.62 0.83 
Elements Royalty regime 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.50 0.33 0.38 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.24 0.19 0.25 0.17 0.38 0.00 
  Safety Culture 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.31 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.38 0.33 0.36 0.37 0.24 0.43 0.33 
Corporate layer Training 0.33 0.37 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.35 0.31 0.33 0.36 0.33 0.36 0.29 0.33 
  Safety Procedures 0.29 0.26 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.28 0.30 0.40 0.29 0.33 
Direct layer Behavioural 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.20 0.36 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.35 
  Capability 0.23 0.27 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.17 0.17 
  Weather 0.15 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.22 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.13 
  Safety design 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.17 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.22 
  PPE 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.30 0.11 0.14 0.21 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.13 
Behavioural  Attitude 0.50 0.56 0.62 0.00 0.57 0.56 0.50 0.50 0.62 0.50 0.54 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.57 
elements Motivation 0.50 0.44 0.38 1.00 0.43 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.38 0.50 0.46 0.53 0.50 1.00 0.43 
Capability  Physical 0.42 0.41 0.33 0.00 0.36 0.43 0.44 0.00 0.43 0.22 0.31 0.40 0.41 0.00 0.30 
elements Mental 0.58 0.59 0.67 1.00 0.64 0.57 0.56 1.00 0.57 0.78 0.69 0.60 0.59 1.00 0.70 
Physical Lack of fatigue 0.39 0.43 0.50 0.43 0.42 0.39 0.42 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.47 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.21 
Capability  coordination 0.33 0.30 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.38 0.26 0.33 0.36 0.32 0.36 
  Fitness 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.30 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.32 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.29 0.27 0.32 0.43 
Mental  Knowledge  0.53 0.63 0.50 0.47 0.44 0.60 0.50 0.62 0.53 0.53 0.64 0.53 0.64 0.44 0.54 
Capability  Intelligence 0.47 0.38 0.50 0.53 0.56 0.40 0.50 0.38 0.47 0.47 0.36 0.47 0.36 0.56 0.46 
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Appendix III 
MATLAB code to solve seven unknown reliabilities of the Reliability Model. 
clc; 
clear all; 
 
A=[0.9829 0.9823 0.9353 0.9962 0.9808 0.9723 0.976 
0.9661 0.9656 0.8849 0.9776 0.9659 0.9503 0.9597 
0.9408 0.9517 0.8422 0.9707 0.9573 0.9334 0.941 
0.9182 0.9409 0.7995 0.9597 0.9488 0.922 0.9221 
0.8802 0.9283 0.763 0.9475 0.934 0.8991 0.8723 
0.8658 0.9162 0.735 0.9363 0.9181 0.8842 0.8508 
0.8553 0.9086 0.7054 0.917 0.9061 0.8658 0.8307 
0.8438 0.8997 0.6785 0.9016 0.894 0.8527 0.8192 
0.8332 0.8912 0.6528 0.8911 0.8816 0.839 0.8051 
0.8247 0.8828 0.6298 0.886 0.8743 0.825 0.7935 
0.8165 0.8759 0.6101 0.8781 0.8674 0.8135 0.7803 
0.8084 0.8691 0.5905 0.8702 0.8606 0.8021 0.7672 
]; 
n=length(A(:,1)); 
m=length(A(1,:)); 
tol=10^-4; 
B=zeros(n,m); 
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%mean values inputs 
a1=.33; a2=.3; a3=.37; a4=.33; a5=.3; a6=.37; a7=.18; a8=.27; a9=.12; a10=.43; 
a11=0.19; 
a12=.26; a13=.12; a14=.43; a15=.18; a16=.25; a17=.13; a18=.44; a19=.36; a20=.3; 
a21=.34;a22=.34; 
a23=.3; a24=.36; a25=.31; a26=.32; a27=.37; a28=.32; a29=.33; a30=.35; a31=.31; 
a32=.32; a33=.37; 
v=zeros(1,7)+.98; 
 
Delx=.0005; 
sss=4; 
upb=[.99,.99,.99,.99,0.99,.99,.99]; % the result of previous data (before updating), for 
example here up to 2009. This helps to solve the problem quicker 
 
for j=1:n 
    if j>1 
        upb=B(j-1,:); 
    end 
     
    Cap=0; 
    vexf=zeros(1,7); 
    while Cap<1000 
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        Cap=Cap+1; 
        lob=upb-sss*Delx; 
        er=1000; 
        erv=zeros(7,1); 
        vcal=zeros(7,1); 
        vex=zeros(7,1); 
 
        for i1=lob(1):Delx:upb(1) 
            for i2=lob(2):Delx:upb(2) 
                for i3=lob(3):Delx:upb(3) 
                    for i4=lob(4):Delx:upb(4) 
                        for i5=lob(5):Delx:upb(5) 
                            for i6=lob(6):Delx:upb(6) 
                                for i7=lob(7):Delx:upb(7) 
                                    esum=0; 
                                    for i=1:m 
 
 
                                        Rw=i1; Rcoo=i2; Ri=i3;Rpo=i4;Rsp=i5;Rrr=i6; Rvl=i7; 
                                        Rt=Rpo*a7+Rsp*a8+Rrr*a9+Rvl*a10; 
                                        Rpr=Rpo*a11+Rsp*a12+Rrr*a13+Rvl*a14; 
                                        Rsc=Rpo*a15+Rsp*a16+Rrr*a17+Rvl*a18; 
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                                        Rf=Rt*a22+Rpr*a23+Rsc*a24; 
                                        Rlf=Rt*a25+Rpr*a26+Rsc*a27; 
                                        Rk=Rt*a19+Rpr*a20+Rsc*a21; 
                                        Rp=(1-(1-Rf)^(0.29)*(1-Rlf)^(0.38)*(1-Rcoo)^(.33)); 
                                        Rme=(1-(1-Rk)^(.54)*(1-Ri)^(.46)); 
                                        Rc=(Rp)^(.36)*(Rme)^(.64); 
                                        Ra=Rt*a1+Rpr*a2+Rsc*a3; 
                                        Rm=Rt*a4+Rpr*a5+Rsc*a6; 
                                        Rb=(1-(1-Ra)^(.49)*(1-Rm)^(.51)); 
                                        Rppe=Rt*a28+Rpr*a29+Rsc*a30; 
                                        Rsd=Rt*a31+Rpr*a32+Rsc*a33; 
                                        wea=Rw^.15; 
                                        saf=Rsd^.21; 
                                        per=Rppe^.18; 
                                        beh=Rb^.25; 
                                        capa=Rc^.21; 
                                        Rcal=wea*saf*per*beh*capa; 
                                        vcal(i)=wea*saf*per*beh*capa; 
                                        esum=esum+(vcal(i)-A(j,i))^2; 
 
                                    end; 
                                    if esum< er 
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                                        er=esum; 
                                        vex=[i1,i2,i3,i4,i5,i6,i7]; 
                                    end 
                                end 
                            end 
                        end 
                    end 
                end 
            end 
        end 
 
        if (vex<upb)&(vex>lob) 
            vexf=vex; 
            break; 
        else 
            upb=min(upb,vex); 
            upb; 
        end 
        if (vex==upb) 
            upb=upb+Delx*3; 
        end 
        esum; 
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        Cap; 
    end 
    vex; 
    vexf; 
    B(j,:)=vexf; 
end 
 
B 
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Appendix IV 
MATLAB code to find two parameter Weibull distributions for each of the seven 
reliability elements that require direct input. 
clc; 
clear all; 
A=[1 0.9735 
2 0.9525 
3 0.934 
4 0.917 
5 0.89 
6 0.874 
7 0.858 
8 0.845 
9 0.8325 
10 0.821 
11 0.81 
12 0.801 
];  
n=length(A(:,1)); 
te=0; 
bet=0; 
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cap=0; 
tel=60; 
bel=.7; 
lbd=[tel,bel]; 
delt=.01; 
delb=.001; 
del=[delt,delb]; 
ss=50; 
ubd=lbd+ss*del; 
wei=[0,0]; 
erm=1e-4; 
while cap<1000 
    cap=cap+1; 
    er=exp(30); 
    lbd=ubd-del*ss; 
    for i=lbd(1):del(1):ubd(1) 
        for j=lbd(2):del(2):ubd(2) 
            ers=0; 
            for ij=1:n 
                ers=ers+(A(ij,2)-(exp(-(A(ij,1)/i)^j)))^2; 
            end 
            if ers< er 
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                er=ers; 
                te=i; 
                bet=j; 
                wei=[te,bet]; 
            end 
        end 
    end 
    if (wei<ubd)&(wei>lbd) 
            wei 
 
 
